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Why do some people choose to engage in politics while others opt out? My core
thesis is that two features of contemporary politics have a detrimental impact on
participation in the electorate. The first of these two features is the discrepancy between
the political agenda of the individual (what issues they consider important) and that of the
political ruling class. The second stems from work suggesting that the conservativeliberal dimension represents the structure behind the issue stances of the political elite
well; but that the same is not quite true for the general population (e.g. Carmines, Ensley,
and Wagner 2011). Misrepresented citizens – whose views don’t align with the
conservative-liberal dimension – are more likely to turn away from politics to the
detriment of the process of democratic representation.
I tested my hypotheses in models of increasing complexity using four preexisting
datasets (generally including more representative data and boasting a larger N, providing
20 multivariate models in total) as well as three compiled exclusively for purposes of this
dissertation – adding 9 models and a set of highly relevant variables at the cost of
representativeness.
The positive role of agenda congruence in predicting participation is not supported
by empirical findings, although further analysis of sample characteristics calls into

question the validity of this result and points to an interesting direction for future
research. The relationship between ideological congruence and ‘traditional’ means of
political engagement (encompassing a range of activities from campaign contributions
through contacting officials to participation in boycotts and active support of NGOs) is
robust, although ideological congruence appears unrelated to voting and online
participation.
These results call for the introduction of ideological incongruence into public as
well as scholarly discourse, especially with respect to its negative ramifications regarding
political participation and representation.
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CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
Why do people participate in politics? Or to put it more accurately, why do some
people participate in politics while others opt out? And why are these questions important
for democracy and political science? It is these broad issues I set out to investigate in my
dissertation through the introduction of two previously unstudied variables, agenda
congruence and ideological congruence.
My core thesis is that two features of contemporary politics have a detrimental
impact on participation in the electorate. The first of these two features is the discrepancy
between the political agenda of individual members of the public (what issues they
consider important) and that of the political ruling class. I argue that electorate members
who feel (not necessarily consciously) that the ruling elite focuses on ‘the wrong issues’,
issues they do not attribute high importance to, will be less likely to participate. My
second main argument stems from the observation that the conservative-liberal
dimension1 represents the structure behind the issue stances of the political elite quite
well but it fails to do so for a substantial segment of the rest of the population.
Misrepresented citizens – whose views do not map onto the one conservative-liberal
dimension – are more likely to turn away from politics. Most ideology scholars agree that
one dimension is far from perfect at capturing the full scope of ideology (Hibbing, Smith,
and Alford 2013; Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008; Jost et al. 2003). Why do political
scientists keep using it, then? There are several reasons, including the dimension’s

1

For the most part of this dissertation I will use the conservative-liberal and right-left dimensions
interchangeably. While I think there are significant differences between the two – at least in some contexts
such as Eastern Europe – both represent the highest level dimension of ideology.
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simplicity, convenience, and the general agreement that ‘it works well enough’.
However, perhaps it only ‘works well enough’ among those who participate because
those for whom it works are more likely to participate.
But why should we care about all this? The simple answer is, participation is vitally
important for the process of representation in democracy, which justifies understanding it
and its predictors as a worthy endeavor. Political science has uncovered numerous
variables associated with various forms of political participation, and yet, we don’t seem
to be doing a great job of predicting this key variable. An oft-cited article (Plutzer 2002),
for example, mentions 32 variables accounting for 31% of the variance in voting.
Matsusaka and Palda's (1999) efforts at predicting the same variable using four
representative Canadian datasets seem to yield even less encouraging results with the
reported R-squared values varying between 3.1% and 14.5%. This suggests that there is a
lot of variance to be accounted for with respect to this important behavior that is not
captured by currently used variables. Thus, uncovering two new variables that play a
significant role in participation is a worthy contribution to the corresponding literature.
Based on arguments developed below, I also believe it is possible that these variables
contribute significantly more to the prediction of political participation than several
others, potentially necessitating a revision of what really drives participation in different
segments of the electorate.
My unique contribution is twofold, theoretical and methodological. As far as theory
is concerned, my focus will be on addressing congruence, building on existing literature
but taking it in two new directions. With respect to agenda congruence, I will take the
ideas put forward at a macro level by Jones and Baumgartner (Baumgartner and Jones
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1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2004, 2005) and apply them at a micro level. This is
particularly important because individual-level incongruence has not been studied before
nor its consequences regarding participation (prior literature was concerned with the
population’s agenda taken as a whole as well as how it relates to representation,
necessitating comparison with the elite’s agenda as a whole). In the case of ideology, I
take two starting points to their conclusion. First, ideologically incongruent citizens
participate less. In its original form, this argument was made using two dimensions,
economic and social, which leads to the second extension opportunity: the public’s
ideology is not two- but multidimensional. Taken together, these two arguments
necessitate a new way to look at congruence and participation. In later chapters of this
dissertation I will advance a framework to facilitate this process.
As far as methods are concerned, I plan to contribute in two ways. First, agenda
congruence and ideological congruence will be treated as continuous variables instead of
dichotomous ones used to isolate groups. Thus, I will take into account a spectrum rather
than just a few discrete categories, resulting in a more complex analysis and realistic
picture while building on the strengths of previous scholarship. Second, I will utilize an
SEM analytical framework to test all my hypotheses in the same multivariate models,
including a number of interaction and mediation effects. This is especially important to
see how the relationship between congruence and participation works when studied in a
broader context including various other relationships. Both of these approaches represent
extensions on prior studies and go beyond current research.
If I show that features of the political arrangement discourage some people from
participating and thus distort representation, it will have the potential to serve as a solid
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argument for political reform. In other words, my results may contribute to a broader
platform advocating change in the current system of democracy. In addition, if there are
negative consequences of the current agenda and ideological discrepancies (especially in
today’s increasingly polarized political climate, see Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012),
the public needs to be aware of their potential repercussions regarding representation.
Politics is one of the most important subsystems in society, at times quite literally a
matter of life and death. Government today (and democratic representation in general)
could certainly benefit from more participation and less apathy. It is possible, however,
that the current ideological alignment discourages a significant minority of individuals,
many of whom may hold issue positions, but feel like the particular combination of their
stance on these issues is not represented by either side of the conservative-liberal
spectrum. Thus, in order to have a chance at increasing participation, we may need to
change parts of the system itself, which is impossible absent reliable information on what
features discourage what forms of participation and how.

1. Outline
The rest of this dissertation will proceed as follows. The first chapter contains my
theory and literature review, which I start by discussing my dependent variable, political
participation, and the reasons why I chose to study its specific forms, voting, traditional
and online. I then introduce my two key independent variables, agenda congruence and
ideological congruence. While these are significantly different from each other, my
reasoning regarding their relationship with participation is similar. First, I expect those
whose agenda (what issues they consider important) is not represented by the political
elite to participate less. Second, I posit that there is a key difference in how well the
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dominant conservative-liberal dimension represents the structure behind the political
views of the elite (very well) and the public (well for some but not for others). As a
consequence, individuals whose views do not fit the category tend to participate less.
In order to complete the conceptual picture, I dedicate the end of the first chapter to
the discussion of other variables frequently associated with participation. The main focus
is on political interest, which I expect to moderate the relationship between both
congruences and participation. I also introduce two variables, education and socioeconomic status, both of which are expected to perform a double function as controls as
well as variables implicated in two sets of supplementary hypotheses.
I present the hypotheses derived from these theoretical considerations in chapter
two, followed by a detailed description of the measurement of each variable. In the final,
third section of the second chapter I conclude this process by presenting a summary of
my analytical framework and the expected path model.
Chapters three and four are centered on results. In the former I use ten, mostly large
N datasets that were collected for other projects, mostly by other researchers (with the
exception of the Dimensions of Political Thinking dataset represented in section two). In
the latter, I test my hypotheses in three datasets specially designed and collected for the
purposes of this dissertation. Within each section I proceed from bivariate to complex
multivariate models.
Finally, chapter five contains the general discussion of my results as well as my
conclusions, the limitations of my approach, and recommendations for future research.
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2. Participation
Political participation is my key dependent variable. Taking a broad view (and
accounting for as many distinct form as reasonable) when tackling it is important for two
reasons. First, to arrive at as wide theoretical applications as possible. Second, because
this is the only way to allow for the possibility of differences in the relationship between
participation and my independent variables. Thus, in this section I isolate and briefly
discuss three different forms of political participation, voting, traditional or offline, and
online participation.
2. 1. Voting
The first form of political participation I study, voting, requires no definition. It is
essential for the “one person, one vote” form of democracy and is arguably the most
important and direct form of participation. Accordingly, it is one of the most studied (A.
N. Campbell et al. 1960; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; S. L. Popkin 1991; S. Popkin et al.
1976; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). It is important to point out, however, that at least
half of this literature is concerned with the direction of voting (e.g. Bafumi and Shapiro
2009; Bartels 2000; Kedar 2005; Warwick 2011), in other words how people vote instead
of whether or not they vote. Even young Europeans – otherwise prone to alternative
forms of participation – recognize voting as the most effective way of influencing highlevel decision making (Horvath and Paolini 2014). Relative to other forms of
participation, the costs of voting – while dependent on a number of factors such as
electoral rules, frequency or socio-economic status – are comparatively low while its
general level (i.e. the number of people engaging in voting) is relatively high.

7
2. 2. Traditional forms of political participation2
Apart from voting, many other forms of participation have been identified and
studied (Brady, Verba, and Lehman Schlozman 1995; Lane 1959; Putnam 2000;
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schattschneider 1960). This literature emphasizes the role
of civic engagement in addition to and beyond voting, which is deemed essential for a
functioning democracy. What is common in these behaviors is the objective to achieve
political goals or express issue preferences. Furthermore, they are all fundamentally
social activities and entail incurring higher costs than voting (more time and/or effort
invested). When operationalizing these behaviors, most studies (e.g. Bäck, Teorell, &
Westholm, 2011) rely on the framework established by the seminal work of Verba & Nie
(1972). The authors distinguished three forms in addition to voting (‘modes’ in the
original language): campaign activity, citizen-initiated contact, and cooperative
participation. Subsequent scholarship significantly expanded this scope – see Sabucedo
and Arce (1991) for an alternative classification, Kaase (1999) for the use of noninstitutional aspects, or van Deth (2001) for a comprehensive overview. This expansion
in scope also meant introducing new forms such as more or less violent (occupying
space, buildings, etc.) or previously unstudied civic (strikes, membership in voluntary
associations, see Bekkers 2005) participation. Alternative forms have been studied across
a variety of cultures including South Korea (Ha, Kim, and Jo 2013) and Singapore
(Rodan 2009), emphasizing that these modes may work in contexts where voting is
hindered, choices are restricted or the context is simply different. Based on these works, I

As a name, ‘offline’ may be more justified to contrast these with their subsequent counterparts. However,
‘traditional’ captures the essence of these forms as they have been available for a long time as opposed to
newer avenues that opened with advances in technology.
2
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selected twelve forms to study under the umbrella of traditional participation (see the
Appendix for specific details).
2. 3. Political participation online
The Internet has changed virtually every facet of our lives including politics,
bringing about political science’s prerogative to catch up to this trend and incorporate it
into theory. Accordingly, some recent studies (Bakker and de Vreese 2011; Horvath and
Paolini 2014; Vissers and Stolle 2014; Zukin et al. 2006) noted the importance of online
forms of participation, especially for young citizens. It is important to note that what
brings these activities together is the medium through which they take place, not other
characteristics. Nevertheless, they share at least two features. They are relatively low cost
– after all it takes a few seconds and clicks to share a political video, which is almost
insignificant compared with in-person participation. Moreover, these actions share with
each other as well as other forms of participation their goal, which is to express political
thoughts and/or preferences. Due to their novelty there is little literature and theory to
rely on, and no prior data available. Nevertheless, because of their common fundamental
goal, I expect them to behave similarly to other forms of participation and be predicted by
the same variables.

3. Agenda (Congruence)
For a significant length of time, public opinion research has been dominated by the
view that the public’s ideology could be represented by people’s views on issues of the
day (Converse 1964; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Nie and Andersen 1974; Wilson
and Patterson 1968; Zaller 1992). In recent years, however, some have suggested that
concentrating exclusively on issue preferences may put political science at the risk of
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missing important relationships. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) drew attention to what
they termed process space and thus highlighted the importance of adding citizens’
preferences regarding the ‘how’ of democracy to studies focusing solely on the ‘what’.
Further, although not the first to mention its importance (Cobb 1983; Kingdon 1984), it
was Baumgartner and Jones (1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2004, 2005) who brought the
study of agenda to the forefront of political science research.
But what exactly is agenda and why is it important? The answer to the second part
of this question is, because it has the potential to heavily influence the process of
representation and the mechanics of democracy. The definition of agenda depends on the
specific subject under scrutiny. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) characterize it as the
policy issues (preferences) that are important to relevant actors in a polity at a certain
point in time. The authors created the Policy Agendas Project, which has collected a vast
amount of publicly accessible data on the agenda of five groups: the public, Congress, the
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and the news media represented by The New York
Times. The specific methodology varies depending on the actor. However, the project
works with a unified coding scheme that allows researchers to categorize agenda
elements the same way in all cases in order to draw comparisons. Diverse agendas can be
measured on a common scale because the importance of an issue is signaled by how often
it occurs in various analyzed documents. Take the most important problem (MIP)
paradigm, for example. Respondents in large-scale public opinion surveys are asked an
open-ended question along the lines of ‘In your opinion, what is the most important issue
facing the United States (or other polity) today?’ The answers are recorded and coded
using the universal scheme mentioned above. No doubt in part due to its simplicity, this
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item has made its way to numerous large datasets including the World Values Survey and
the Barometers (Euro, Latino, Africa).
The extended time frame (most indices are available starting in the 1950s) adds an
important dimension to Jones and Baumgartner’s efforts in that it allows researchers and
interested parties to see how different issues come and go in different groups’ agendas. It
also has the potential to shed light on the interrelationships among different players and
how they affect one another. Two of the authors’ key findings are that: 1) the elite’s
agenda follows that of the public over time (dynamic representation occurs moderated by
institutional friction, also see: Bevan and Jennings (2014) and Mortensen (2010)); and 2)
the public’s agenda is narrower in scope than that of elites; whereas elite members juggle
various issues with more or less similar subjective importance, the public’s agenda is
centered on a small subset of these issues at any given time.
In this dissertation I will use Jones and Baumgartner’s framework with an important
difference: a shift in focus from the macro to the micro level. Instead of studying the
electorate as a whole, I want to see what happens if I home in on each individual’s
personal agenda instead. This is particularly important because, although embedded in a
social context, participation is, at its essence, an individual-level act. Even if it occurs in a
group, if we are to study its predictors we need to know whether certain individuals took
part or not. Thus, while aggregate-level data were sufficient to connect agenda and
representation in past research, I need individual-level theory and data to study agenda
congruence and participation. In other words, while Jones and Baumgartner showed how
representation works in the case of agenda and aggregate discrepancies (for which their
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data were obviously entirely satisfactory), I am interested in how individual differences
in this discrepancy affect individual-level participation.
Let us imagine a landscape of all possible political issues. Now let’s attach a
number between 1 and 5 to each of them where 1 = very unimportant to me (I don’t care
about it at all) and 5 = extremely important to me (I care about it greatly). The
comprehensive aggregate of all these for each member of the electorate is what I term
personal agenda. Note that in this framework, everyone has a personal agenda. If one is
not at all politically inclined their values for each issue will simply be at or close to 1.
There are two reasons why I will take a broad view of agenda. The first stems from
a core question: what is political? An issue considered important by the political elite at
any given time? Jones and Baumgartner’s own results refute this definition by
highlighting the ephemeral nature of agenda. What’s political today may not be
considered so tomorrow (think of organized crime or alcohol sales in the political
landscape of today versus a hundred years ago) and vice versa. My point is, there is
nothing inherently ‘political’ about political issues. Every and any issue that has to do
with relations between people may be treated as political, and thus be subject to study.
Taking a broad perspective is especially important to account for people with strong
feelings about issues that only infrequently surface in mainstream politics.
Second, it is reasonable to assume individual differences regarding citizens’
personal agenda. If we think back to the landscape of 1-5 evaluations, it is highly likely
that not many people’s landscapes are exactly the same. Some may, for instance, attribute
a 3 (moderately important) or 4 (important) to organized crime, 1 to abortion, 2 to gay
marriage, and 5 to military spending, while others may do the opposite or anything in
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between. In order to tackle these differences, I need a broad representation of as many
issues as possible.

4. Ideology
Ideological congruence (Idc) is my second key independent variable. Its operational
definition is fairly straightforward: how well the conservative-liberal ideological
dimension represents the organizing structure behind one’s policy preferences. Thus, my
focus is on the relationship between the elite’s and the public’s ideology. A key related
argument I make is that there is a difference between the ideological congruence of the
political elite and the electorate. Specifically, I argue that the conservative-liberal (C-L)
dimension represents the vast majority of the former very well, but that is not the case for
the general population, where there are significant individual differences. These
differences, in turn, lead to varying levels of ideological congruence. Past research (with
one notable exception discussed below) has not explicitly addressed this possibility. I
believe, however, that to have a chance at understanding ideological incongruents, we
need to see their ideology in relation to that of the ruling elite.
4. 1. The Elite’s Ideology
There are several arguments to support the claim that the conservative-liberal
dimension adequately represents the structure behind the political elite’s views and policy
preferences.
In the United States, the dominant two-party system and the close relationship
between party affiliation and ideology are two manifestations of the political spectrum’s
one-dimensional nature. Here, Republicans are – for the most part – ideologically
conservative as much as Democrats are liberal, especially since the realignment has
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concluded (Abramowitz and Saunders 2013; Levendusky 2009). It is likely that, in
accordance with Duverger’s Law, one of the driving forces behind this two-pronged
separation is the first-past-the-post system (Fey 1997; Riker 1982), although the direction
of causality and even the effect itself have been debated outside the U.S. (Dunleavy,
Diwakar, and Dunleavy 2008). In most circumstances, it is in the parties’ and politicians’
best interest to help voters in democratic polities differentiate among different players. At
least one cleavage is needed for this purpose. Accordingly, most scholars rely on only
one dimension. But why only one?
First, a unidimensional structure adds a useful heuristic and saves electorate
members time and effort, which is no small feat in today’s world of information overload.
It is much easier to know who is for or against gun control, more or less military
spending, or pro-choice or pro-life if there are only two major alternatives available. Two
solid end-points add predictability to the system. Second, there are historical reasons for
the existence of one ruling dimension. The distinction between the parties of tradition and
progress goes back to the time of the French Revolution, and allegedly has deeper
underpinnings potentially harkening back to the dawn of human civilization (Hibbing,
Smith, and Alford 2013; Lakoff 1996; Pinker 2002; Sowell 1987). In most democracies –
and even authoritarian systems – the separation of two visions, progressive and
conservative is, and has been present for at least the past few centuries.
The system is not perfect as the occasional resurgence of third parties in the U.S.
demonstrates. Nevertheless, all the theoretical and empirical evidence and the
distinction’s high utility for research purposes provide more than enough reason to trust
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its explanatory power, at least in the case of political elites,3 especially if we consider the
success of expert judgments in using the left-right (C-L) dimension to categorize various
political actors across a large number of polities (Castles and Mair 1984; Gabel and
Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). To indicate the robustness of this approach, it is
important to note that this list includes many countries with multi-party systems. Despite
some questions raised (Budge 2000; Tavits and Letki 2009), the success of expert
judgments is among my strongest arguments for high general ideological congruence in
the case of political elites.
4. 2. The Public’s Ideology
Although one dimensions seems to fit elites, this is a questionable assumption for
the public. Two questions that have long intrigued political scientists are: does the
electorate have an ideology? And if yes, how is this ideology structured? Since
Converse's (1964) seminal article, many have weighed in on this subject (Althaus 2003;
Delli Carpini 1997; Kuklinski and Peyton 2007; Taber and Lodge 2006; Zaller 1992) on
all sides. While there is no universal consensus, the evidence appears strong enough to
assert that the answer is yes, at least for a sizeable subset of the general population. In
addition, much of the corresponding research is focused precisely on whether or not the
public’s views line up along the conservative-liberal dimension. I argue, however, that
this approach can potentially miss the point as many members of the electorate may in
fact ‘have an ideology’, only one that does not map onto one dimension. However, this
fact should not be used to assert the lack ideology’s existence, as there is at least one

The only notable exception being Austria, where the elite’s views appear to be structured along two
dimensions (economic and social), not one (Dolezal et al. 2013).
3
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alternative way of looking at the same phenomenon: multidimensionality. At the core of
my dissertation lies the observation that there may be substantial individual variance
regarding this issue. The unidimensional structure may suffice for many, but not all
electorate members.
Studying the public’s ideology along the conservative-liberal dimension has a
certain appeal that should not be ignored. First of all, it is simple. Furthermore (Jost 2006;
Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008) most people (generally 90% or above) seem consistently
able to place themselves along a 7-point conservative-liberal scale. My first problem with
this argument is related to the interpretation of the scale points, which relies on the
assumption that the scale measures real positions while accounting for their extremity.
But if we give it a second thought, how exactly do we know what a 7 means, for
instance? Is it an extreme conservative view at moderate intensity? Or extreme intensity?
Or does it signal someone who feels very strongly about political issues but is a moderate
conservative? Even more important to my point here is the middle of the scale. I claim
that at least some of the 4 responses (which are by far the most common of all, from onethird to half of the entire sample in most cases) do not represent real moderate, middle-ofthe-road attitudes. Instead we are dealing with a variety of possible answers lumped
together because the middle point gives people the opportunity to mask non-placement,
lack of attitude, low political interest, or incongruence, not to mention that the use of the
scale also assumes that people’s preferences line up well along this scale, which is an
assumption I suggest treating as an empirical question instead.
For these reasons I hold the opinion that a much better way to measure this
dimension is the Wilson-Patterson (Wilson and Patterson 1968) scale, which attempts to
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achieve this feat through the use of multiple items. However, once we have enough items,
we can empirically test the underlying factor structure instead of just accepting that a
one-factor solution is ‘good enough’. As the literature below shows, given enough items
a one-dimensional solution is rarely the best representation of the structure underlying the
data. Conversely, multidimensional measures allow for the direct study of congruence
and its effect on participation.
As an alternative, many scholars (Gerber et al. 2010; Jost et al. 2003 and most
notably Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner (2011, 2012a, 2012b)) suggest a two-dimensional
approach relying on the social-economic distinction. I view the two-factor structure as
superior to its one-factor counterpart, but at the same time insufficient in light of all
relevant theoretical and empirical considerations. One argument alone should suffice to
corroborate this: the two-factor solution does not represent the empirical reality well if
we have enough variables to account for other factors of ideology. Furthermore, despite
its popularity (Clagett and Shafer 2010), the economic-social distinction may be
misleading. Economic issues are supposed to include “the government’s role in managing
the economy and providing for the general welfare, such as taxes, spending on health
care, social security, and welfare”; while their social counterparts “deal(s) with cultural,
or moral, values including issues like abortion, gay rights, and prayer in public schools”
(Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011, p. 332.). My first critique of this distinction has to
do with the separation of these issues. If we think of all relevant political issues, can we
confidently put each or at least most of them into one of these categories? Let’s take
immigration for an example. Where does it belong? It would be relatively easy to make a
case for both dimensions, probably meaning that it is economic for some (those who
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oppose/support it for their own economic self-interest based on their professional
prospects) and social for others (those that focus on the racial, religious, and cultural
aspects of the issue) or maybe even both or neither. What about marijuana legalization,
military spending and the rest? Part of the problem is the vagueness of the ‘social’
category. The economy is a relatively separate subsystem but on a deeper consideration
we cannot help finding that there is no ‘social’; instead it is expected to include all other
societal subsystems such as education, bureaucracy, public health, defense, etc. (most of
which are intertwined with economic issues anyway).
If the social-economic dimension does not paint an accurate picture of the
underlying structure behind the public’s ideology, how many should we replace it with?
And what should be included in these new factors? Multiple authors offer a variety of
solutions, designed to tap Social Dominance Orientation (Ho et al. 2012; Pratto et al.
1994), attitude toward change, tradition and tolerance (Jost et al. 2003; Schwartz,
Caprara, and Vecchione 2010), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer 2006) and
others. The number of relevant dimensions ranges between three and six, although it must
be noted that most of the corresponding literature appears to cover the same factors – just
structured differently. Consequently, I suggest a comprehensive approach with five
relatively easily distinguishable factors (as outlined in Feher et al., 2014).
It is logical to start with the ecomonic dimension, often referred to as welfare or
distribution of resources. Specific related issues include business regulation, differential
economic rewards (equality), aid to the disadvantaged (McClosky and Zaller 1984), free
enterprise and minimal government involvement in the economy (Schwartz, Caprara, and
Vecchione 2010), and also welfare, social security and affirmative action (Jost 2006).
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The next four dimensions may be viewed as an extension of the social factor
discussed above. Relying on the importance of traditional values in politics, or it flipside,
attitude toward change has been consistently found to be an important aspect of ideology
(Gerber et al. 2010; Goren 2005; Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2003; McClosky and Zaller 1984).
These values are usually linked to religion and are strongly tied to endorsement of timehonored social norms in the face of new, permissive lifestyles (Schwartz, Caprara, and
Vecchione 2010; Smith et al. 2011).
The third factor I isolate, intergroup relations, summarizes several avenues of
literature encompassing the role of (blind) patriotism, attitude toward immigrants and
foreign military intervention, military spending or defense and aggressive military action
against terrorists, and immigration policies (Huddy et al. 2005; Jost 2006; Schwartz,
Caprara, and Vecchione 2010; Smith et al. 2011). In addition, there is another aspect of
intergroup relations that has been well-studied on its own: Social Dominance Orientation
(SDO, Pratto et al. (1994)). Given its relatively narrow scope and close proximity to
related issues, I suggest treating it under the umbrella of intergroup relations.
Norms exist in every known society. Individuals who violate these norms have to
be punished to avoid (too many) freeriders. The treatment of rulebreakers was first
proposed to be included in the study of ideology by McClosky and Zaller (1984). The
most important underlying concepts are punishment of deviants (Hibbing et al. 2014;
Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013; Jost et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2011) and the maintanance
of law and order (Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010), commonly reflected in
specific issues such as the death penalty, mandatory minimum sentences, or preference
for rehabilitation over harsh punishment.
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Finally, attitudes toward the government’s role (how much power it should have
and how actively it ought to wield that power) is a pervasive issue frequently mentioned
in US as well as international politics. Goren (2005), Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008),
Jost (2006), and Smith et al. (2011) all highlight its importance as a factor of ideology.
This factor has the potential to be the driving force behind many attitudes including some
discussed above, such as welfare or military spending. Going beyond that, however, it
can also be expected to carry significance in itself.
The paper containing these arguments offers empirical evidence that a six-factor
structure – including a somewhat debatable one that emerged during data analysis,
labeled ‘Big Brother’ (government’s ability to monitor and be involved in our day-to-day
life) – represents the relationships in the data4 in the three cultures studied significantly
better than a one- or two-factor solution, provided there are enough variables to extract
these factors. Based on these results, it seems likely that the public’s agenda is indeed not
unidimensional, opening the door for the empirical study of ideological congruence and
raising questions about the elite’s ability to provide thorough representational coverage.
Given the significant differences theoretical between these factors, also backed up by
empirical evidence, I argue that they should be treated separately.

4

The same as used in chapter 3, section 2 of this dissertation.
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4. 3. Ideological Congruence
My operationalization of ideological congruence is a direct extension on relevant
work by Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner (2011, 2012a, 2012b). Given the importance of
their findings and analytical framework for this dissertation, it is warranted to dedicate
some space to a quick summary here.
Carmines et al. start off by criticizing the self-identification measure of the
conservative-liberal dimension for reasons similar to those discussed above, while also
corroborating the idea that the one-dimensional structure is accurate for the elite, but not
the public. Their solution to the problem, however, is based on a two-factor solution.
Relying on the economic-social separation, they distinguish five ideological groups in the
electorate: Liberals, Conservatives, Moderates, Libertarians, and Communitarians.
“Moderates are defined as those respondents who are within a one-half of a standard
deviation of the origin in any direction” (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012a, p. 7.),
based on factor scores for the two dimensions derived from a CFA of ANES data.
Regarding the other four, the labels speak for themselves with Conservatives and Liberals
being the consistent categories (scoring in the same direction on both dimensions) and
Libertarians and Communitarians representing their inconsistent counterparts.
The authors’ key results support the argument I made above in that the middle
category of self-placement is an attractive alternative for many ideologically incongruent
respondents. They also find that although the two incongruent groups appear close to
moderates based on their self-identification, when it comes to political knowledge and
action they are significantly different from them. Another consequence of incongruence
pertains to party identification: “[incongruent citizens] do not have partisan attitudes that
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befit a polarized society. Instead, they remain ambivalent, regularly shifting their
allegiances between the Republican and Democratic Parties and showing no signs of an
overall increase in partisanship [unlike their congruent counterparts]” (Carmines, Ensley,
and Wagner 2012b, p. 3.).
Finally, the authors also study the consequences of incongruence regarding
participation. From the vantage point of this dissertation, their most important finding is
that moderates and ideologically incongruent citizens participate less in activities that
correspond to my operationalization of traditional participation. It is important to note,
however, that this relationship seems tenuous at best for voting, suggesting a different
effect on various forms of the dependent variable. Furthermore, the effect appears to be
disproportionately stronger for a particular group of incongruents with no representation
(as opposed to the periodically resurfacing Libertarian movement/party):
Communitarians, members of the electorate who prefer a strong federal government and
traditional social values. Even though the differences are not great enough to support the
‘dark side of civic engagement’ coined by Fiorina (1999), they are nevertheless
substantial.
However, the arguments outlined above fundamentally undermine the twodimensional solution used by the authors on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Once
we accept this fact, we must take the next logical step toward the study of ideological
congruence. In practice, this presents a challenge compared to Carmines, Ensley, and
Wagner (2011)’s original analysis. Recall their five groups based on two factors
(Liberals, Conservatives, Moderates, Libertarians, and Communitarians). If I split my
participants into three categories based on each of my six factors along the same lines
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(with moderates in the middle and one on either side), it would result in 36-5 = 724
groups to analyze. This goes to show that a group-based approach is virtually impossible
above a certain number of dimensions. Luckily, there is a robust way to circumvent this
problem without sacrificing interpretability, and at the same time moving toward higher
level statistical models. The key is constructing one continuous ideological congruence
variable relying directly on factor scores, as I will present in the next chapter. While I
believe this approach to present a significant improvement, my main point is that this step
follows logically from the above presented arguments and is thus necessary.
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5. Political Interest, Education, Socio-economic Status and Other
Variables Associated with Participation
Discussing a set of other variables commonly associated with political participation
is important for two main reasons. First, to populate my multivariate models with
appropriate controls. Specifically, it is imperative to see if the relationships I hypothesize
regarding my key independent variables are found valid in a multivariate framework.
Second, in some cases, such as with political interest, I also expect these variables to have
an effect on the relationship between my key independent and dependent variables.
My conceptual understanding of political interest, the most important related
variable from the perspective of my hypotheses, encompasses the following related
concepts: interest in politics and political issues; the importance of politics in general and
in the individual’s own life compared to other spheres of life and types of activities;
general tendency for interest and involvement outside one’s narrow social circles with
respect to news, world issues, and politics; and general feeling toward politics. Political
interest, has usually not been in the spotlight of political science studies. Two notable
exceptions are Boulianne (2011), who found that different media sources may have a
different impact on interest; and Torcal and Maldonado (2014), who show that political
discussions may actually work against interest, at least in some circumstances. However,
the most common practice is to use interest as a control (Bekkers 2005; Mutz 2002).
Since one of its roles will be to serve as a control variable, it is important to draw a
clear line between political interest and political participation to avoid circular
argumentation. While this may be somewhat blurred in practice (as some might argue
that showing interest is a moderate form of political action), in theory it is simple: the
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first is passive while the second is active. Analogous to the attitude-behavior distinction
in psychology, one represents internal processes while the other is when individuals put
them into action in the external world. Previous scholarship (e.g. Parry, Moyser, and Day,
1992) used the same logic for excluding these forms from participation.
Another one of the variables frequently associated with participation is education.
In fact, the positive relationship between the two is among the most consistent findings in
the literature (A. N. Campbell et al. 1960; Nagler 1991; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry
1996; Tenn 2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This rich literature necessitates
education’s inclusion in models predicting participation, at least as a control. However,
recent research (Berinsky and Lenz 2011; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Persson 2015) has
raised a number of questions about this relationship, such as: How and why does the
positive relationship between education and participation come about? Does education
have a direct effect or does it work through other variables? What happens in education
that leads to an increase in participation? Political knowledge and interest are the most
obvious “culprits.” Presumably, the more time one spends in the educational system, the
higher the chances that one will acquire more knowledge about the social world and the
relevant issues within it. Moreover, education has the possibility to turn people toward
politics and help them recognize the importance of politics and various issues (at the very
least the impact of rising college costs). Some programs, such as political science,
sociology or economics, may facilitate this process even more than others. The next
avenue is through social networks. The more time individuals spend in education, the
more opportunities they have to build networks in general, and politicized ones in
particular. Furthermore, through classes and extracurricular activities
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(fraternities/sororities, clubs, etc.) they have a higher chance to encounter more people
with diverse political views and potentially even get a sense of engagement at the local
level (e.g. through involvement in student representation). And lastly, it is possible that
education works in tandem with socio-economic status in at least two ways. Higher
education leads to an increased chance for obtaining higher SES, a higher-paid and
respected job, and in general a higher status in society. At the same time, college –
especially in the U.S. – is expensive, giving higher SES people an increased chance of
attaining higher degrees and in general spending more time in the education system.
With respect to my main theory, first I want to see if the relationship between
congruence and participation holds if I account for education as a control. Furthermore, I
will also study the effect of education on participation directly. While not part of the
central tenet of this dissertation, the above outlined debate justifies some effort directed at
replication and empirical study of the different pathways between education and
participation. Moreover, it is important to test if these relationships remain statistically
significant after the addition of my key independent variables.
The next variable, socio-economic status, stands out as one of the most widely
recognized among predictors that show a positive relationship with participation (Beck
and Jennings 1982; A. N. Campbell et al. 1960; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt 1969; Verba and
Nie 1972). The original argument (Aldrich 1993) has a distinctive rational choice flavor
by relying on a cost-benefit calculation; namely, people with more resources at their
disposal have more (time, money, effort) to spare, and this results in more opportunities
to engage in politics (Downs 1957). In addition, there may be more at stake for them,
both regarding vested interest and potential benefits (they pay more if there is a tax
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increase, for example). For reasons similar to those discussed above, I will use this
variable both as a control and as a variable of interest in two supplementary hypotheses.
Next I turn to the three essential categories whose priority in perception and
cognition is widely accepted in the psychology literature (Contreras, Banaji, and Mitchell
2013; Schneider 2004). Gender is a ‘classic’ control variable almost always included in
political science models. In earlier times it would doubtlessly have played a larger role in
predicting participation. Even in the United States of 1997, Verba, Burns, and Schlozman
found that men participated more in a certain set of activities, more specifically a subset
of what I termed traditional participation: contributing to campaigns, belonging to
political organizations, and contacting government officials. The authors also isolated
four variables expected to mediate this relationship: SES, social networks, political
interest, and education. Due to this variable’s rather tangential role to my central point, I
will not include it in a hypothesis. I will, however, use it as a control in my multivariate
models and allow for the indirect relationships mentioned above. Regarding race and age,
the situation is similar: I will only study the effect of these two variables in a more
limited scope as controls.
The process of linking individuals to politics occurs through two broadly interpreted
channels: social networks and direct contact. Regarding the former, scholars (Banks and
Roker 1994; D. E. Campbell 2006; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Kedem and Bar-Lev 1989;
Kraut and Lewis 1975; Tedin 1974) have isolated three main environments in which
socialization takes place: the family, school, and peer groups, all of which are embedded
in the general environment or ‘political culture’ (usually represented by the media). My
key takeaway from this literature is the importance of social networks regarding politics.
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Directly studied by numerous authors in recent years (D. N. Campbell 2013; Christakis
and Fowler 2011; Robert Huckfeldt 2014), it seems networks cannot be ignored as
important environments for the transmission of political views, values, and even
activities. Specifically, I will use two aspects of networks as controls: the individual’s
own standing in them (opinion leader versus follower role), and how politicized they are.
The direct link between politics and the individual will be tackled through five
related variables: general attitude toward political actors (trust in institutions),
partisanship direction and strength, civic duty, and political efficacy. It is important to
include these as multivariate controls in order to isolate the independent effect of my key
independent variables. Each has been established as an important predictor of
participation. The first refers to general attitudes directed at the political system as a
whole as well as its specific actors such as politicians, key institutions, and the media. It
has been studied by numerous scholars and isolated as an important predictor of
participation. Kaase (1999), for example, demonstrates how trust (in institutions as well
as its general, interpersonal counterpart purportedly located one step earlier in the causal
chain) plays a role in predicting participation in multiple Western European polities. The
most common means to measure this concept is as trust in various institutions relevant in
a given polity. These institutions inevitably include parties and other partisan ones (such
as the Presidency), which points to a connection between this variable and partisanship,
the latter shown to have its own impact on participation (A. N. Campbell et al. 1960;
Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015; R. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). An important distinction
here is between the strength and the direction of partisanship. The latter may be more
related to the evaluation of some institutions, but partisanship strength appears to be
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heritable (Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009) and probably plays a stronger role in
predicting participation than partisanship direction.
Civic duty – the internalized norm that political participation and voting are every
citizen’s duty – was first used as a ‘saving grace’ for rational choice models to explain
why people vote despite the alleged irrationality of the act (Blais et al. 2014; Bowler and
Donovan 2013; Weinschenk 2014; Zukin et al. 2006). Political efficacy, on the other
hand, refers to the perceived impact and importance of the individual’s participation. Not
surprisingly, both show a positive relationship with voting and institutional participation
(Kenski and Stroud 2006; Moeller et al. 2013), and both have been indicated as important
mediators between other variables and participation (Klemmensen et al. 2012; Verhulst
2012).
I use these five political variables as controls in my multivariate models, which
raises the potential issue of multicollinearity since most of them are likely to be relatively
closely related concepts. I will account for this potential effect by investigating their
bivariate relationships and removing some from multivariate models if necessary.
The last variable in this section, religiosity, is easily captured by a few direct items,
and has been associated with participation on a number of accounts (D. N. Campbell
2013; Scheufele 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This justifies its inclusion as
a control, especially since it is conceptually different enough from the above discussed
variables not to compete for the same portion of the variance in my dependent variables.
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CHAPTER 2. HYPOTHESES AND MEASUREMENT
I start this chapter by introducing the hypotheses derived from the theory presented
in chapter one. The next, second section contains a detailed description of how I measure
each variable. In the final, third section of chapter two, I conclude by presenting a
simplified version of the final path model I expect to corroborate following each
multivariate analysis presented in chapters three and four.

1. Hypotheses
I have four sets of hypotheses derived from the theory outlined above. The two sets
of core hypotheses are centered on the idea that incongruent citizens (with respect to
agenda in Hypotheses 1a-c and ideology in Hypotheses 2a-c) participate less. The second,
supplementary set (containing Hypotheses 3 and 4) is designed to replicate wellestablished relationships between education and socio-economic status and participation
to see if they hold in a multivariate framework including congruence as well as various
other controls and mediation effects.
I hypothesize a positive linear relationship between agenda congruence and
participation (Hypothesis 1a). In other words, I expect that the more well-represented an
individual’s agenda is by the political elite, the more likely they will be to see a point to
participatory acts because they feel there is a higher chance the issues relevant to them
will be focused on. To put it another way, even if electorate members are not conscious
of any congruence, it is more than possible that elite rhetoric is more likely to speak to
congruents than incongruents on significantly more issues, prompting higher participation
in the former and lower in the latter. For the same reasons I expect this positive
relationship to hold in multivariate models, represented by a positive beta weight (H1b).
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What this hypothesis states is that agenda congruence is conceptually different enough
from political interest and a set of other variables previously associated with participation
to not compete with them for the same portion of the variance in the key dependent
variable, participation.
Regarding my expectation for ideological congruence, I hypothesize a positive
linear relationship between this variable and participation (Hypothesis 2a). As I argued
above, the conservative-liberal dimension represents political elites’ ideology quite well.
Therefore, I expect that the better it covers that of individuals, the more likely they will
be to feel that their voices may be heard in the way they prefer. To put it another way,
consider that most candidates’ expressed issue preferences align along the conservativeliberal axis. If that is not the case for individuals, said candidates will only reflect
agreement with them on a handful of specific issues. It is also possible that they will
agree with different candidates on different issues, potentially even to a similar degree.
For severely incongruent members, it will be impossible to figure out how to match their
preferences to those of elites. Electorate members who find the direction of their issue
preferences consistently unrepresented may even lose faith in elites’ ability to represent
them and turn away from politics. In other words, persistent incongruence may diminish
trust in the political system as a whole and lead to lower levels of participation through
this avenue (with the moderation of trust in institutions or democracy, for example).
Based on the same logic, I also expect the positive relationship between ideological
congruence and participation to hold in multivariate models containing a host of other
variables selected based on preceding research (reflected in a positive weight, H2b).
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The expected relationship between political interest and both of my key
independent variables is equally important. Since my argument is basically the same for
both IVs, I will present it here using ideological congruence, with the side note that I
expect the same pattern for agenda congruence. First, I will utilize political interest as a
control variable to test if there is more to congruence than simple interest. However,
beyond competition, I predict cooperation between my key IVs and political interest
when predicting participation in the form of a moderation effect. I expect the positive
relationship between political interest and participation to differ across levels of
congruence, although I expect the relationship to remain positive across all levels.
However, the positive relationship between congruence and participation may not always
exist. It is possible that at lower levels of interest, congruence does not matter. These
individuals have, for some reason, turned away from politics and not much in the way of
congruence can change that. At higher level of interest, however, the picture changes.
Low congruence leads to individuals’ feeling that their own ideology is misrepresented
by the political elite (whose members fit into the categories of ‘conservative’ and
‘liberal’, while these individuals do not). As a consequence, they will participate in
politics to a lesser degree, but not enough to turn the relationship between political
interest and participation around. To put it another way, people with high ideological
congruence and high political interest will be much more likely to participate in politics
than those with low ideological congruence and high political interest. Therefore, I
hypothesize a positive interaction between political interest and agenda, as well as
ideological congruence when predicting participation in multivariate models (Hypotheses
1c and 2c), as demonstrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Expected pattern of interaction between ideological congruence and political interest in
predicting participation.

As the next and final step in this section, I present the two sets of supplementary
hypotheses derived from the theory presented above. Based on the four avenues I
outlined in section five of the first chapter with respect to the relationship between
education and participation, I expect these variables – political interest (H3b), political
knowledge (H3c), social network characteristics (H3d), and socio-economic status (H3e)
to fully mediate the relationship between education and participation. I hypothesize full
mediation and no direct relationship (H3a) because the literature offers no other ways
education may affect participation. This also entails that the null hypothesis in H3a
should only stand where I can measure all of these paths, since inability to do so opens
the door for an indirect relationship ‘masquerading’ as a direct one. Finally, this use of
education should alleviate the criticism raised by Persson (2015), namely that in most
cases researchers do not have a clear idea of what exactly they are controlling for when
they add this variable to their models.
Although some authors have highlighted other possible moderation effects (Tam
Cho, Gimpel, and Wu 2006), the direct relationship between SES and participation seems
entrenched in the literature with good reason, leading me to formulate it as Hypothesis
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4a. In addition, I will also investigate one mediation effect by testing if SES exerts an
influence on participation through political interest. One reason for this is the above
mentioned self-interest and resource availability. In addition, most better paid
occupations allow and some mandate being informed about matters of the world. My
expectation is a positive indirect regression coefficient showing that apart from having an
independent effect, SES raises political interest and thus positively impacts participation
(H4b).
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2. Measurement
In this section I report how the variables detailed above were measured in three
datasets specifically designed for this project. Most of them were operationalized in a
similar fashion: first by collecting a list of items and then running a series of
confirmatory factor analyses. This way each individual variable was assigned a weight
based on their contribution to the given factor.5 The factor score resulting from CFAs
was, in turn, used as a – usually well-behaved and reasonably normal continuous –
variable to represent the underlying construct in subsequent analyses. In all confirmatory
factor analyses I used maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors (MLR)
in Mplus. I fix factor variances at 1 and means at 0 while leaving item variances or means
unconstrained. As a general rule items were only retained as part of a latent factor if that
factor accounted for at least 33% of their total variance (reflected in standardized
loadings). When making adjustments to models I used the modification indices and
residual covariances provided by the application to determine if certain items should be
part of the allocated factor (or the model in the first place). Model fit was assessed
through two indices: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA where values
of .06 or below indicate good fit), and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI, considered
acceptable with values of .8 or above). These indices do not provide information
regarding the accuracy of the factor structure, but they do indicate how well the model
fits the data.

5

Technically, variables are weighted the other way around, but I regard this phrasing more informative and
thus an acceptable simplification.
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I included the entire survey in the Appendix. Thus, in the remainder of this section I
focus on the selection of specific items and its rationale, as well as the manipulations I
used to construct my key variables.
The most commonly used and simplest way to measure voting is self-report, which
I also relied on despite some shortcomings,6 with the difference of using voting frequency
instead of the more common binary item. With respect to other forms of participation,
beyond the usual list of institutional forms (campaign participation, rally attendance), I
also included some other activities that are traditionally less emphasized in the literature,
such as petitions, participation in protests or NGO support. The reason I believe these
ought to be counted as participation is their goal, which is the same as that of other forms
more closely tied to institutions, namely to have an impact on affairs and/or express
political views and preferences. The same reasoning, coupled with the brief theory
presented in section 2. 3. of chapter one, led me to include a set of variables tapping
online participation.
I used the set of issues represented in the Appendix to tap individuals’ political
agenda. Regarding the political elite’s agenda, the obvious choice of reference point is
the Policy Agendas Project. To achieve adequate reliability, I used four separate sets:
Congressional bills, roll call votes, State of the Union speeches, and Supreme Court
rulings. With respect to the time period, I opted for the duration of the Obama presidency

6

One shortcoming of this approach is that people tend to over-report their voting patterns (Bernstein, Chadha,
and Montjoy 2001; Silver, Anderson, and Abramson 1986). An alternative is obtaining actual recorded voting
data. While at first appealing, however, this approach is not free of its own limitations. Obtaining records
costs money, rules out anonymity due to the necessity of matching, and is not a viable option in many
countries outside of the U.S. A further complication in the United States is the relatively great mobility of its
citizens.
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(starting in 2009 with the 11th Congress7). I started the process of variable construction by
identifying the absolute frequency (number of times mentioned/included) of each issue
using a series of relevant functions in Excel. Dividing these frequencies by the total
number of relevant responses yielded an indicator of the absolute importance of each
subtopic. The next step was converting these percentages to the same scale (1-5) as that
used by my participants. Given that there are 220 subtopics, if they were all equally
represented, each would receive 0.4545% (1/220) of the coverage of various decision
makers. Subsequently, I established the following cutoffs to convert percentages into 1-5
importance ratings: <0.15%=1; 0.15%-0.3%=2; 0.3%-0.6%=3; 0.6%-1%=4; >1%=5.
During the conversion I also took into account the differential importance of my specific
items within subtopics.8
Acknowledging that this measure is not the most intuitive way of capturing the
elite’s agenda, 9 I tested its robustness through a comparison with an alternative. This
entailed ranking all subcategories by their frequency and applying a quintile split so that
instead of arbitrary cutoffs, I assigned 1 to the 1/5 of subcategories least frequently used,
2 to the second quintile and so forth. The next step was simply taking this number for the
subcategories relevant to my own list and comparing it with the original measure. The
end result corroborates the robustness of the latter: the two correlate at .9 in the case of

7

This excluded the New York Times index which only contains data up until 2008.
Gender and sexual orientation-related discrimination, for example, are both located within subtopic 202.
They also cover most of the issues in this subtopic, indicating a reasonably close to 50-50 split between the
two specific issues. Climate change, on the other hand, is only one of the many potential issues falling under
subtopic 705 which also includes air pollution, water storage-related issues, and noise pollution, among
others.
9
The credit for this acknowledgment goes to Kevin Smith.
8
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Congressional bills, .97 for roll call votes, .98 for State of the Union addresses, and .95
for Supreme Court cases.
The final step was subtracting the individual’s own importance rating for each issue
from the corresponding number representing the elite’s importance, and averaging out the
absolute values of this subtraction across all issues covered. Let me demonstrate this
process through the example of illegal immigration. In the Policy Agendas Project
codebook, immigration falls under category 900, Immigration and Refugee Issues, along
with a host of other related policy areas such as INS enforcement of immigration laws,
immigration and education issues for aliens, adjusting visa allocations based on applicant
job skills, citizenship issues, expedited citizenship for military service, etc. Category 900
was mentioned 514 times in Congressional bills in the time period covered. This is 1.73%
of the 29682 bills coded for policy area. Based on the coding scheme presented above,
this results in my assessment of this issue as very important to the political elite, marked
by the value of 5. Similarly, it received a 3 for roll call votes, 5 for State of the Union
speeches, and 5 for Supreme Court rulings, each based on the corresponding percentages.
Considering these numbers, I conclude that this issue has indeed been very important for
the political ruling class of the United States since 2009. Consequently, a 5 will represent
it in my subsequent calculations, meaning that if an individual marks it as 1 (not at all
important), his or her agenda congruence for this particular issue will take the absolute
value of [1-5] = 4, the lowest possible.
In order to tackle ideological congruence, I used the six-factor structure outlined
above as a starting point. Once I arrived at a well-fitting final model, I obtained scores for
a second-order factor to approximate participants’ ‘real ideological positions’. This
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number played a key role in the construction of ideological congruence. It is very
important to distinguish this second-order factor from the conservative-liberal dimension,
especially in light of the arguments outlined above for why we should not take its
existence for granted. I will simply call it ideology to emphasize this distinction. In short,
it represents whatever way the six factors are tied together in a given polity. In Eastern
Europe, for example, welfare items load very differently compared to Western Europe
(Tavits and Letki 2009). As we will also see in section four of chapter three, the way
individual factor loadings contribute to this second-order ideology factor also varies
substantially in different cultures. There may be a degree of overlap, but there is no
reason why this should correspond to preconceived ideas of conservative or liberal.
To construct a measure of ideological congruence, first all scores had to be brought
to the same scale (while their mean and SD are almost the same and close to 0 and 1,
their minimum and maximum usually shows substantial variation), which was achieved
through simple arithmetic rescaling. The first step of this was adding their minimum
value to every factor score, thus making 0 the new minimum of each. Next, I found the
new overall maximum, which was simply the average of the new maximum scores across
all ideology factors (in order to minimize deviations due to differences in scale), M. With
M established, I was ready to apply the following formula – which contains all
manipulations – to obtain the rescaled scores: (FA+min)*(M/(max+min)), where FA is
the original factor score and min and max stand for each factor’s original minimum and
maximum values.
With the rescaled scores available, the only remaining step was computing
ideological congruence. This was done in two steps. First, I took the absolute value of the
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difference between each factor score and the second-order ideology factor. Second, I
computed the mean of these differences across all factors to obtain my ideological
congruence measure.
Let me demonstrate this process and its outcome through an example. For
simplicity, all factors will be scored so that higher values represent a ‘more conservative’
attitude. Congruent Cal filled out the MTurk version of my survey in accordance with his,
on average, moderately liberal views. He rebelled in college against his religious
upbringing and has come to embrace progressive values with regards to politics. Thus, on
the Traditional values factor he scores -1.68. At the same time, he perceives today’s
international political climate as increasingly hostile and dangerous, requiring the United
States to take strong measures to ensure national security. Consequently, his Intergroup
relations overall score is .76. His other scores are -3.26 for Economy and welfare, -2.54
for Strong vs. limited government, and -1.23 for ‘Big Brother’. Finally, Cal believes in
the legal system and in upholding law and order, but values the system’s rehabilitation
function over its punishment aspect. For this reason, he marked 2 (strongly agree) for the
item ‘Rehabilitation of criminals should be stressed over punishment’. At the same time,
he also thinks running the nation’s prisons in too lenient a manner would impede their
deterrence function, so he only checked -1 (moderately against) for ‘Those serving jail
time should be denied any comfort.’ His final score on the law and order factor is -.75.
The statistical package computed his second-order ideology score as -1.14.
These numbers are, however, not in the same scale. After shifting them up by the
minimum of each, the average of their maximum values came to 5.47. After using this
number to rescale every score according to the above formula, Congruent Cal’s final
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ideology score became 2.2. His new factor scores are 1.56 for Traditional values, 2.45 for
Intergroup relations, 1.78 for Welfare, 2.01 for Strong central government, 2.17 for Big
Brother and 2.12 for Law and order. We can see from these numbers that on some factors
Cal’s score is very close to his ‘actual ideological’ position (represented by the secondorder factor score), while he deviates from that in a ‘conservative’ directions for
Intergroup relations, and a ‘liberal’ one for Traditional values and Welfare. The only step
left is using these numbers to compute Cal’s ideological congruence score. The above
formula yields 0.27, indicating very high ideological congruence for Congruent Cal.
Another example is the case of Incongruent Iris. Her rescaled factor scores range
from 0 to 6 with an overall second-order ideology score of 3, dead in the middle. She is
very traditional-minded and a born-again Christian. She challenged these views in college
and decided that they align with her upbringing and represent her preferences after years
of intellectual scrutiny. Furthermore, she is a proud American, which is an integral and
important part of her personal identity. She is inherently distrustful of outgroups, a
feeling heightened by recent terrorist attacks. Therefore, her Traditional values (rescaled)
score is 4.5 followed by an Integroup relations score of 5. At the same time, however, she
is a firm believer in a strong government that provides for its people and monitors
citizens to keep them safe. Therefore, her scores for Economy and welfare, Strong vs.
limited government, and Big Brother are 2, 1.5, and 1.75, respectively. Finally, she is
quite middle-of-the-road about how to treat rule-breakers, resulting in a Law and order
score of 2.85. The average difference of these scores from her second-order ideology
factor score of 3 is 1.23, indicating that Incongruent Iris is, unsurprisingly, very low in
ideological congruence.
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In order to acquire a qualitative measure of ideological congruence to illustrate my
findings, I also included the following question in my own datasets immediately after the
conventional self-placement item: “How well do you think this conservative-liberal
dimension represents your own political views?” The question was then followed by an
open-ended one asking respondents to briefly explain their choice. Their answers will be
used to give the results presented in chapter four a little extra ‘qualitative flavor’.
While I believe that my approach described above accurately captures ideological
congruence, it does not take into account the moderates vs. everybody else distinction so
pivotal to the work of Carmines et al. In order to alleviate this concern, I constructed a
separate, ideological intensity variable to serve as a control in multivariate models. This
was done by simply aggregating each rescaled factor score’s deviation from its new mean
(the idea being that the mean signals the most moderate attitude).
Finally, I measured socio-economic status through a small set of variables,
specifically: family’s income category, subjective class membership, and job status.
Education was measured using the conventional, single-item approach tapping the level
of education obtained. While technically categorical, I followed established practice in
treating it as continuous. The degree to which my respondents’ various networks are
politicized I tackled with direct items, including the frequency of political discussion in
various groups, family’s and peer group’s general attitude (feeling) toward politics in the
present as well as in the past, and preference for leadership roles in a variety of networks.
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3. The Expected Path Model
We are now in position to outline a simplified sketch of the expected final path
models based on the expected relationships described above.

Figure 2 Simplified path diagram of the expected relationships. Direct links to participation are
omitted as are controls not implicated in mediation effects.

The right side of Figure 2 presents the four core hypotheses of this dissertation,
H1b and H2b pertaining to the direct relationship between the two key independent
variables and participation, with H1c and H2c representing their moderating effect on the
relationship between political interest and the DV. On the left side we find five
supplementary hypotheses related to the effect of education and socio-economic status,
complemented by H4a, the latter’s expected direct impact. The only hypotheses not
included in the figure are the two bivariate ones (H1a and H2a) and the null regarding
education’s direct effect (H3a). Finally, the list of controls I plan on using is the
following: gender, race, age, general attitude toward political actors, partisanship
direction and strength, civic duty, political efficacy, and self-reported stress-tolerance.
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS DERIVED FROM PREEXISTING
DATASETS
1. ANES 2011
The corresponding section of the official website of the American National Election
Studies describes the details of sampling and data collection relevant to the 2011 wave as
follows:
The ANES 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government and Society Study
(EGSS) is a series of surveys conducted over the Internet in 2010-2012
using samples representative of the national population of adult citizens.
Each survey has a separate sample; this is not a panel study. […] Topics
include policy issues, the economy, and attitudes toward and evaluations
of President Obama and other political figures. Survey questions for the
EGSS came from the public proposal process on the ANES Online
Commons. The EGSS 3 data were collected from December 7 to 13, 2011,
from 1,262 respondents, with an estimated response rate (AAPOR RR3) of
about 2.5 percent. (American National Election Study - 2010-2012
Evaluations of Government and Society Study, 2012).

The resulting sample is representative for region of the United States, age (with a
mean of 49.34 (SD=16.64)), race (77.1% White, 8.4% Black, 8.7% Hispanic), education
(58.7% had no college degree), and gender (49.7% male). The final N is 1315.
1. 1. Variables
I started the process of variable preparation by running a series of CFAs10 to obtain
my dependent variables for future analyses. The model had good fit with an RMSEA
index of .043 (95% between .040-.047) with a virtually 100% chance of its being below
.05. The CFI index further corroborated this result at .932. Of the four variables initially

10

Technically IRP because all of the variables were categorical, mostly binary, thus ruling out CFA. The
format of reporting is similar enough.
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included to tackle voting behavior, three formed a coherent factor. These three aspects
pertain to the two past elections (2008 presidential and 2010 congressional, both binary
yes/no items) and the self-reported percentage chance of voting in the then next election.
The resulting variable was a well-behaved factor score with a skewness indicator of .898, signaling that the majority of people in the sample self-report higher than average
levels of voting. The second factor taps both aspects of participation. Institutional with
items like [“Have you in the past 12 months…”] contacted a government official; given
money to a political candidate, issue, or cause; volunteered for an issue or cause. The
non-institutional aspect of participation was assessed through responses to two different
stems: 1. “Do you actively participate in any of the following types of organizations or
groups?”, with some answer options being women’s groups, non-partisan civic
organizations, and groups representing racial/ethnic interests; and 2. ”In the past 12
months, have you...”, with answers such as attended a community group meeting or
worked with others in your community to solve a problem. The final factor had 18 items
and a slight positive skew (.438). Voting and participation are correlated at a relatively
high level as r=.587 (p<.001) indicates.
The ANES framework was not designed to target political ideology, which
manifests in relatively constrained variable availability. The final model containing all
items I found relevant had acceptable fit (RMSEA = .061, with virtually no chance for
being below .05, CI95 = .058-.065; CFI = .906) and contained five factors capturing a
relatively narrow scope of ideology. The first factor deals with the support for private
Healthcare and social security (an example item: “Replace Social Security with private
retirement accounts that people manage themselves”). The second factor contains seven
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items pertaining to several aspects of Taxation in the context of reducing the national
deficit: raising taxes on the wealthy, increasing the minimum wage, etc. The third’s items
correspond to the federal government’s Fiscal policy in general (e.g.: “Reduce U.S.
federal government spending on everything the government spends money on”). The
fourth factor deals with the perceived degree of discrimination (“How much
discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups?”)
against five groups: Blacks, Hispanics, gays and lesbians, women, and Muslims. The
final, fifth factor has four items about who is to blame for the situation of Blacks in the
United States, themselves or systemic racism (“It's really a matter of some people not
trying hard enough”; or “If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as
whites”).
It is worth noting that these factors – three of which deal with economic issues and
two with discrimination – provide barely acceptable coverage of ideology while many
important elements of the underlying construct remain untapped. It is perhaps a
consequence of this that the correlations among these factors are rather low, ranging
between .232 and .438 (with one exception being as low as .142). Their loadings on the
second-order ideology factor are, however, acceptable between .517-.666 in each case.
The ideological congruence measure was computed in the manner outlined in chapter
two, using the rescaled version of these factor scores as well as the second-order factor.
The resulting variable had a mean of .81 (.35), ranged between 0 and 2.06, and possessed
a skewness indicator of .469, showing that values tend toward less incongruence. As
described in chapter two, I will follow the example of Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner
(2012b) by using the original factor scores as controls in all multivariate models.
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Many of the other relevant variables at my disposal needed no manipulation:
partisanship, political efficacy, age, sex, and education I simply used in their original
form. There were, however, four constructs in the case of which I applied the principles
outlined in chapter two and ran CFA models in order to obtain factor scores. The first,
Political interest, contained items such as: “How interested are you in politics and public
affairs?” and “How often does the subject of politics come up in conversation with
friends, family, or how interested are you in politics?” It is telling that these form a
coherent factor: contrary to my theory, in this sample with these variables politicized
social networks cannot be separated from political interest. The second factor represents
an evaluation of the President’s work (“How much is President Obama to blame for the
poor economic conditions of the past few years?” or “Do you approve or disapprove of
the way Barack Obama is handling each of these issues? (job, energy, etc.)”), which is
more likely a measure of partisanship than an evaluation of the institution of the
Presidency. And finally, the dataset contained several variables that I collapsed into two
factors measuring Socio-economic status and Religiosity.
1. 2. Results
Ideological congruence correlates with voting at a .044 level (p=.116), and with
participation at r=.068 (p=.015), lending partial support to Hypothesis 2a. These low
correlations do not give rise to high hopes about how ideological congruence will fare in
a multivariate analytical framework, a simplified version of which is the next step in this
section. As will be the case in all corresponding sections henceforth, both ideological
congruence and political interest were entered into the regression centered around their
mean.
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Voting
b

β

Participation
P

b

β

P

Ideological congruence

.096
.043
.155
.066
0.087
0.009
(.057) (.025)
(.056) (.024)

Political interest

.477
.541
.548
.592
<.001
<.001
(.021) (.021)
(.021) (.019)

Idc*Polint

.175
.073
.205
.082
0.003
0.001
(.059) (.025)
(.062) (.025)

Constant

-.097
(.019)

R2

29.9% (.022)

<.001
<.001

.054
(.019)
36.1% (.022)

.004
<.001

Table 1. Multivariate regression predicting participation from ideological congruence, political
interest, and their interaction.

Ideological congruence is a significant positive conditional predictor of
participation, approaching significance even for voting and thus partially confirming
H2b. In general, participation goes up by about .1 unit for each unit increase in
ideological congruence, controlling for political interest at its mean. Furthermore,
Hypothesis 2c is also supported by the significant positive interaction term observed in
both models.
To arrive at the final extended path model, I started with a full model containing all
predictors for each DV as well as all possible mediation effects (education through
political interest, for example). In a series of subsequent steps, I proceeded to eliminate
the predictors with the lowest beta weight and highest p value, one at a time. My key
variables (in this case only ideological congruence) are exceptions to this rule, the
purpose of the whole exercise being to study them and whether they retain significance in
a multivariate framework. The same applied to their interaction terms with political
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interest but only if they reached significance in the simplified models. Indirect effects
have the potential to be significant despite a very low b and beta weight (due to their tiny
standard errors), which is why I will only report them if they reach a beta weight of .015.

Figure 3. Multivariate regression predicting voting. The arrows toward variables other than voting
represent indirect relationships. All displayed weights are standardized (β) followed by their
standard error and p value.

As the upper right hand side of Figure 3 indicates, ideological congruence has
neither a significant direct conditional effect on voting, nor does it moderate the effect of
political interest on the dependent variable. Contrary to the previous (simpler) model,
these results refute H2b and H2c. Hypothesis 3a is also disconfirmed by education’s
significant direct effect. On top of this direct impact, however, education does show an
effect on voting moderated by political interest and socio-economic status, supporting
H3b and H3e. Regarding socio-economic status, its direct effect supports H4a, but the
lack of mediation by political interest (β = .008, SE=.010, p=.449) works against H4b.
Additionally, the final model contained four other variables of interest outlined in chapter
two. Of these, ideological intensity emerged as an independent predictor (β = .075, SE =
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.022, p<.001), and so did partisanship strength (β = .095, .017, p<.001). Finally, two
controls not represented in the figure are age, which emerged as a strong significant
predictor (β = .240 (.023), p<.001), and gender, which proved non-significant (β = .033
SE = .022. p=.137). The R2 of this model is formidable and significantly higher compared
to its simple interactional counterpart’s at 40.3% (p<.001).
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Table 2 completes this section by presenting the second multivariate regression
model with participation as the dependent variable.
Participation

IV

b

Β

P

Ideological congruence

.093
(.054)

.040
(.023)

.083

Political interest

.384
(.024)

.427
(.024)

<.001

Idc*Polint

.069
(.059)

.029
(.024)

.239

Political efficacy

.056
(.020)

.072
(.025)

.005

Ideological intensity

.279
(.054)

.135
(.026)

<.001

Education

.084
(.011)

.200
(.025)

<.001

SES

.081
(.024)

.086
(.025)

.001

Age

.009
(.001)

.176
(.023)

<.001

Constant

.028
(.025)

R2

.253

42.1% (.021)

<.001

MEDIATION EFFECTS
Education --> Political
interest

.014
(.004)

.034
(.010)

.001

Education --> SES

.039
(.006)

.094
(.014)

<.001

SES --> Political interest

.009
(.012)

.010
(.013)

.449

Table 2. Multivariate regression predicting institutional and non-institutional participation.11

11

The model also contained gender as a non-significant control (β = .031, SE = .022, p=.153).
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Regarding the core hypotheses, neither ideological congruence nor its interaction
with political interest appears to have a significant effect on participation (although the
latter approaches significance) when controlling for all other variables in the model at
their mean (due to centering, this meant 0 in practice), resulting in the rejection of H2b
and H2c. The case of education is different: the independent effect of this variable
prompts the rejection of H3a, but the corresponding mediation effects once again confirm
H3b and H3e. Conversely, socio-economic status’ direct effect confirms H4a, but lack of
mediation by political interest refutes H4b. Regarding the variables not implicated in
hypotheses, ideological intensity emerges as a significant positive predictor, along with
political efficacy and age, the latter sporting the third highest β weight of all variables in
the model.
In sum, while some supplementary hypotheses are confirmed based on the ANES
data analyzed in this section, those pertaining to my key independent variable, ideological
congruence, are rejected in a multivariate framework.
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2. Dimensions of Political Thinking
The three connected datasets presented in this section are analogous to those used
by Feher et al. (2014). The authors of the conference paper describe the sample and their
data gathering efforts as follows:
[…] we administered the online survey to participants in three countries:
the U.S., Hungary and Denmark. It contained 72 self-developed items
designed to tap […] dimensions of political ideology. All items were
measured by 7-point Likert scales. The only labeled points were the two
end points and the middle point: 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neither agree
nor disagree, 7= strongly agree. (…) In addition to these items the survey
also contained the standard Social Dominance Orientation Scale (taken
from Ho et al. 2012) and the Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale
(Altemeyer 2006). Both the SDO and the RWA items were measured on
the same 7-point Likert scale. The survey also contained a standard
demographic and general political battery, and included a hidden attention
question: “This question is testing to see if you are reading the questions.
Please click on five for this question”. […] The resulting (filtered) sample
has 361 American, 161 Hungarian and 168 Danish respondents. The
gender distribution is 329 men and 314 women (37 participants refused to
answer the gender question). Most of the participants were college
students enrolled mainly in introductory Political Science and Psychology
classes (mean age: 21.89, SD=5.104). (p. 8.)

I will analyze these data by country for two reasons. First, cultural differences may
manifest themselves in numerous ways and at several levels, which can lead to 1. scale
items relating to each other differently and thus having differential weights in
determining the corresponding factor structure and scores; and 2. factor intercorrelations
taking a different shape with regard to ideology. To give a concrete example, the
correlation between the Welfare factor and the rest is between .256 and .588 (on average
about .45, except with Strong government) in the United States. In Denmark, the
relationship is even stronger with a .55 average and a range of correlation coefficients
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between .272 and .85. Hungary’s case, however, is very different with Welfare only
showing a significant correlation with one factor, SDO-E.12
2. 1. Variables
The dataset included only one voting (“Did you vote in the most recent election?”)
and four participation items, the latter all pertaining to institutional forms: rally
attendance, working in a campaign, communicating thoughts to elected officials, and
holding political office (all binary items with little variance). The CFA13 model based on
these variables represents the data very well in all three countries: RMSEA=.043, 0, and
.020 (95% between 0 and .122; 0 and .146, 0 and .166; below .05 with a 44.7%, 61.9%,
47.1% chance); and CFI=.994, 1, .998 in the U.S., Hungary, and Denmark, respectively.
Participation has a significant positive skew in all three cases (881 in the U.S., .368 in
HU and .241 in DK), indicating low general levels. Considering the coding of the voting
variable (1=yes, 2=no with answer option 3=not yet eligible removed from analysis), its
own positive skew indicates a level which is moderately high in the U.S. with .526
(62.7% yes, close to real data), but much higher in the case of Hungary (2.422, 88.4%
yes) and Denmark (6.631, 97.1% yes). These numbers, especially the latter two, indicate
either a very high level of over-reporting or a severely distorted sample with regards to
voting. Moreover, the reduced amount of variance foreshadows bad predictive power for
the corresponding models.

12

The reasons for this are outside the scope of this dissertation. Very briefly, I suspect mostly (recent)
historical path dependence at play with the right supporting a stronger state controlling welfare, among other
societal sub-systems, and the left known for privatization following the regime change in 1990.
13
Technically IRP with WLSMV estimation and Theta parameterization for categorical variables. For
simplicity’s sake, however, I will use the two terms interchangeably.
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The correlation between participation and voting is moderately strong in the United
States (.302, p<.001), barely significant in Hungary.180 (p=.041), and not at all in
Denmark (-.129, p=.132).
In the case of ideological congruence, the final models had acceptable fit in all three
cases with RMSEA = .055, .070, and .066 (with a 95% of it being between .052-.058,
.065-.075, and .061-.071; the chance of a below .05 value being negligible) and CFI =
.791, .714, and .770 respectively in the United States, Hungary, and Denmark. The items
left within each factor were notably different, while the factors themselves similar:
Intergroup relations, Treatment of rule-breakers, Traditional values, Welfare, Strong
central government, ‘Big Brother’ (government’s ability to monitor citizens), SDO-E
(equality), and SDO-D (dominance). Factor intercorrelations were between .3 and .8 in
most cases with the exception of BB in the U.S. and Denmark, as well as Welfare in
Hungary. These were removed from the construction of the second-order ideology factor,
whose final loadings all range between .65 and .9.
Ideological congruence was computed in the same way as described in chapter two.
The resulting variable’s mean was close to .78 (SD ≈ .30) in all cases, while its skewness
showed more variation with .590 in the U.S., .454 in Hungary, and .932 in DK, all
indicating relatively low general levels of incongruence.
Unlike those pertaining directly to ideology, other variables relevant to participation
were few and far between in this dataset. As controls I had at my disposal age, gender,
education (years of schooling in total, open-ended and not necessarily too reliable with
many participants entering questionable numbers such as 7), income (a three-category
variable of dubious measuring power), church attendance, race (eventually excluded due
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to extremely little variance), and partisanship (a simple yes/no question tapping the mere
existence of partisan alignment). In addition, the dataset also contained two variables
tackling political interest: a direct question and one regarding the frequency of political
discussion. The .71 correlation between these two prompted the construction of one
overall Political interest factor for subsequent use.14
2. 2. Results
In the United States, ideological congruence is negatively correlated both with
participation (r=-.164, p=.004) and voting (r=-.203, p<.001). Hungary’s case is different
with a positive correlation of r=.155 (p=.062) for participation and r=.196 (p=.026) for
voting. Ideological congruence in Denmark, on the other hand, shows no relationship
with either participation or voting (r=.016 and -.02; p=.843 and p=.791, respectively).
These results lend partial support to Hypothesis 2a, which is only retained in the case of
voting in Hungary (also showing a positive tendency for participation in the same
country). Based on this information, the results derived from interacting ideological
congruence with political interest to predict voting, presented in Table 3, are somewhat
surprising at first glance.

14

Also meaning that, absent a suitable battery on social networks, I was not able to test H3d.
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United States
B

Β

Ideological -.176 -.100
congruence (.083) (.048)
Political
interest

Hungary
P

.035

b

β

Denmark
p

b

Β

p

.160
.159
.028
.074
.098
.058
(.097) (.092)
(.020) (.039)

.197
.326
.058
.138
-.019 -.071
<.001
.158
.339
(.030) (.051)
(.041) (.094)
(.022) (.074)

Idc*Polint

.128
.061
(.103) (.050)

.214

.128
.099
-.049 -.115
.420
.077
(.159) (.122)
(.026) (.065)

Constant

.091
(.027)

<.001

-.012
(.030)

.694

.014
(.014)

.313

R2

14.0% (.037) <.001
4% (.039)
.340
.9% (.014)
.536
Table 3. Predicting voting from ideological congruence, political interest, and their interaction.

As expected based on the very low variance in the DV (voting), the explanatory
power is very weak in Denmark and fairly weak in Hungary. Considering these numbers,
the only surprising result in these countries is that ideological congruence actually
approaches significance (as well as the interaction term in Denmark), while political
interest remains categorically non-significant. On the other hand, ideological congruence
is a significant predictor in the U.S. model but its effect on voting is negative. Moreover,
political interest has a significant conditional effect only in this model controlling for
ideological congruence at its mean (as usual, all predictors were centered around their
mean). Before drawing overarching conclusions and measuring these results against my
hypotheses, however, it is imperative to look at them through the lenses of participation,
the dependent variable with more variance.
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DV
Pars
Ideological
congruence
Political
interest

United States
B

β

-.018 -.007
(.118) (.049)

Hungary
P

.882

b

β

.098
.045
(.126) (.058)

Denmark
p
.440

b

β

-.001
0
(.328) (.171)

p
.998

.556
.663
.549
.615
.798
.578
<.001
<.001
<.001
(.030) (.029)
(.053) (.050)
(.082) (.053)

Idc*Polint

-.041 -.014
(.117) (.040)

.727

-.045 -.016
(.158) (.056)

.774

.036
.017
(.325) (.151)

.911

Constant

.277
(.031)

.001

-.007
(.044)

.880

-.566
(.079)

<.001

R2

44.1% (.038)

<.001

39.0% (.063)

<.001

33.4% (.063)

<.001

Table 4. Predicting participation from ideological congruence, political interest, and their
interaction.

The p values in Table 4 indicate a clear pattern: political interest has a significant
strong positive conditional effect on participation, but it is the only variable that does so.
In light of the likely more informative nature of these findings compared to those
pertaining to voting, I reject Hypotheses 2b and 2c.
Based on the results reported above, it is not surprising that the models for voting in
Hungary and Denmark had no significant predictors and a very low, non-significant R2.
Thus, I will limit my corresponding presentation to the United States.
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United States
B

β

P

Ideological
congruence

-.171
(.089)

-.099
(.052)

.055

Political
interest

.173
(.033)

.291
(.055)

<.001

Party (y/n)

-.212
(.059)

-.209
(.059)

<.001

Age

.011
(.006)

.062
(.034)

.057

Gender

.101
(.051)

.107
(.055)

.047

Constant

-.256
(.037)

R2

15.1% (.033)

<.001
<.001

Table 5. Multivariate regression predicting voting in the United States.

Although the model’s R2 has improved somewhat compared to its simplified
counterpart’s, it still remains remarkably low. Ideological congruence shows an almost
significant negative main effect, while the rest of the variables behave in the expected
fashion (partisanship was coded 0=yes, 1=no). I would, however, put much more stock in
the results presented in the next table with institutional participation as the dependent
variable.

59

United States

Hungary

Denmark

B
β
P
b
β
P
B
β
P
IV
Ideological
.024
.010
.009
.004
-.196 -.101
.828
.959
.267
(.166) (.078)
(.176) (.091)
congruence (.110) (.045)
Political
.557
.658
.418
.500
.733
.531
<.001
<.001
<.001
(.031) (.028)
(.063) (.068)
(.087) (.060)
interest
Treatment
-.150 -.334
.001
of
(.046) (.104)
rulebreakers

Traditional
values

-

-

-

.171
.323
<.001
(.029) (.062)

-

-

-

Welfare

-

-

-

.136
.189
(.062) (.086)

-

-

-

Sdo-E

-

-

-

Party (y/n)

-

-

-

-

-

-.229 -.159
(.100) (.071)

.028
-

-.075 -.175
(.039) (.091)

.055

.022

-.173 -.117
(.100) (.068)

.083

Religious
intensity

.069
.083
(.033) (.040)

.035

Age

.007
.030
(.007) (.030)

.320

.018
.237
.010
.036
<.001
(.005) (.068)
(.013) (.050)

.464

Gender

.028
.021
(.053) (.030)

.593

.141
.107
(.087) (.065)

.107

-.032 -.022
(.100) (.068)

.748

.265
(.041)

<.001

.284
(.127)

.025

-.427
(.13)

.001

<.001

36.3% (.062)

<.001

Constant
R2

44.8% (.036)

<.001

-

-

50.6% (.058)

-

-

-

-

Table 6. Multivariate regression predicting institutional participation.

The predictive power of the extended Hungarian model shown in Table 6 is
especially impressive with the U.S. trailing closely behind and Denmark also producing
an acceptable value. Political interest emerges as the clear strongest predictor with
participation increasing by about .5 unit for each unit increase in this variable across the
board. However, neither ideological congruence nor its interaction with political interest
(removed from the models based on the non-significant results presented in section 2.3.)
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has a significant effect, resulting in the rejection of H2b and H2c. Most controls exert the
predictable impact on participation, although the (only) one significant coefficient in the
cases of partisanship, religious intensity and age is somewhat surprising. Also noteworthy
is the way ideological factors affect the DV with those supporting group equality
participating more in Denmark; and those who support Traditional values as well as
Welfare spending, but oppose harsh Treatment of rulebreakers more likely to engage in
Hungary.
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3. Minnesota Twins Political Dataset
The dataset presented in this section was collected in the framework of the
Minnesota Twins Political Survey15, whose creators reached back to participants of the
University of Minnesota Twin Registry (for details, see Johnson et al. 2001) and asked
them to complete a detailed survey on political and social issues, values and behaviors.
The resulting dataset is publicly available at www.unl.edu/polphyslab, where its
collection is described as follows:
Most of the data collection took place between July 24 and December 22,
2008 with a second period conducted from July 13 to October 30, 2009 in
order to increase the number of complete twin pairs in the study. All
respondents received $35 for their participation and completion of the
survey. The twins in the sample were U.S. adults, born from 1947 to 1956,
thus aged between 53 and 61 at the time of data collection. The gender
ratio of the sample is 39% male and 61% female. […] Data collection was
implemented by the University of Minnesota. Most participants completed
an online survey, but a paper and pencil version was made available
during the 2008 data collection for those with limited Internet access.
During the second wave of data gathering, all participants completed the
paper version. Quartile comparison and t-tests show no significant
differences between respondents who took the survey online and on paper.
A total of 1349 individuals completed the survey. […] Twin samples are
not representative of the entire adult U.S. population for obvious reasons.
However, one of the great advantages of the Minnesota Twins Political
Survey is that its participants broadly represent their cohort of U.S. adults
on many sociodemographic indicators, with the exception of race (1299 of
the 1349 participants were white).
3. 1. Variables
I assessed voting behavior using one item, “Think about all the presidential
elections since you were old enough to vote, have you voted in all of them, in most of

15

I as many others owe a debt of gratitude to those who oversaw this remarkable effort. In their own words:
“data employed in this project were collected with the financial support of the National Science Foundation
in the form of SES-0721378, PI: John R. Hibbing; Co-PIs: John R. Alford, Lindon J. Eaves, Carolyn L. Funk,
Peter K. Hatemi, and Kevin B. Smith, and with the cooperation of the Minnesota Twin Registry at the
University of Minnesota, Robert Krueger and Matthew McGue, Directors.
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them, some, rarely voted, or never voted?”16 Even the item selected is heavily skewed
with an indicator of -1.816 and 89.9% in the top two categories – most likely due to selfreporting bias – signaling caution for the models where voting is the dependent variable.
Regarding other forms of participation, at my disposal were five of the commonly
used yes/no items referring to some aspects of institutional participation. These lined up
very well along one factor as signaled by a model RMSEA of .024 (0-.044, with a 98.6%
of it being lower than .05) and a CFI of .998. The resulting variable has a skewness of
.385, indicating that the average respondent participates moderately little, a characteristic
likely to be representative of the general population. Voting and institutional participation
show a moderate positive linear relationship (r=.324, p<.001).
This is the only dataset in chapter three that contains variables pertaining to
participants’ agenda. For each of the 27 Wilson-Patterson issues, creators of the survey
included a simple question: “How strongly do you feel about …?”; the answer options
being very strongly, strongly, and not strongly. While this measure does provide a rating
loosely connected to my conceptualization of personal agenda, it does not directly
correspond for two reasons. First, it taps ‘strength of feeling’, not subjective importance.
While this may seem like a negligible enough difference, I argue that it is potentially
substantial as participants may feel personally strongly about certain issues without
attributing much societal importance to them. And second, the number of answer options
may serve as a limitation regarding congruence: for my purposes a five-point scale is
likely to be more powerful. Moreover, two more adjustments to the procedure of the

16

The other two voting-related items (voting registration and projected voting) were too skewed toward
positive values, and the latter had hundreds of missing cases.
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construction of agenda congruence described on pages 14-15 were required. Given that
data gathering took place in 2008, I used the frequency ratings derived from the Policy
Agenda’s Project corresponding to the relevant presidential cycle that began in 2001. As
a serendipitous side-effect, this also enabled me to use a fifth rating, the New York Times
index, which only has data up until 2008. The second adjustment required changing my
importance coding scheme from a five-point scale to a three-point one in order to
correspond to the importance ratings used in the Minnesota Twins Political Survey. In
practice it meant altering the percentages described in chapter two to <.4; between .4-.8
and >.8.17 The agenda congruence measure this process yielded closely approximates a
normal distribution with a mean of .719 (SD=.136, skewness .175).
Ideology was primarily measured with the same 27 issues as described above but
with different answer options, asking participants how they felt about them on a simple
three-point scale of agree, uncertain, disagree.18 I combined these with the above
described ratings to create 7-point scales for each Wilson-Patterson item where 1 became
very strongly disagree, 2 strongly disagree, 3 not strongly disagree, 4 uncertain, and so
on. In addition, the dataset contained the Society Works Best index also referenced in
Predisposed (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013), and the Right-Wing Authoritarianism
Index championed by Altemeyer (2006). The final model containing these measures has
an RMSEA of .057 (95% between .055 and .058) and a CFI of .806. The five factors
extracted are: Xenophobia (feeling thermometers toward five ethnic groups in the U.S.),

17

In the case of the New York Times index the number of categories was reduced to only 25. Consequently,
the thresholds had to be altered. I chose to use <3%, between 3-6%, and >6%.
18
I am not entirely convinced of the validity of this measure for the same reasons I outlined while discussing
the conservative-liberal self-placement scale in chapter one.
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Traditional values in politics (school prayer, premarital sex, gay marriage, old-fashioned
ways are still best), Equality (four items such as: “If wealth were more equal in this
country we would have fewer problems”), Welfare (e.g. increased welfare spending), and
Protection and strong government (we need a strong leader, stop illegal immigration).
The factor intercorrelations range between .286 and .727, making it possible to construct
a viable second-order factor, which only contained four factors (excluding Xenophobia)
with significant loadings.
The coverage provided by these factors – leaving several important aspects of
ideology untapped – raises questions about the validity of a factor-based measure of
ideological congruence. Their number also borders on too low, casting further doubt on
whether the difference derived from four factors is capable of accurately reflecting the
full gamut of ideological incongruence.
Being a dataset designed by and for the purposes of political scientists, it is not
surprising that the Minnesota Twins Political Survey boasts a good set of political
variables. The full model containing all of these has great fit as indicated by an
RMSEA=.048 (.043-.054; 68.4% chance below .05) and a CFI=.942. The factors covered
are: trust in institutions, political efficacy, frequency of political discussion in the present
and the past, and network homogeneity (four items such as “In general, do you agree or
disagree with your family's political beliefs?”). Somewhat unfortunately, political interest
was measured using a single item only.
The dataset also contained five questions quizzing respondents about their political
knowledge, each with multiple answer options. I recoded these in order to separate
correct from incorrect answers. The simplest way to convert the recoded items into one
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political knowledge variable was through confirmatory factor analysis.19 A little over a
third (36.9%) of the sample obtained the maximum available score. As a direct result of
the construction of this variable, every wrong answer decreased this score by an amount
dependent on the item’s contribution to the factor (for example, “What is the main duty
of the U.S. Congress?” was a substantially easier item than “How much of a majority is
required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?”).
Common demographic controls were also included in the dataset. Of these, race and
age did not show nearly enough variation: 98.6% of the sample was white and age
appeared to range between 52.63-62.84. Gender was not very balanced either with only
37.4% of participants being male. On the other hand, religiosity and education all
appeared fairly balanced with acceptable variance and skewness indicators under .15.
Socio-economic status, however, did not have very good coverage with only two useful
items: income (six categories but 22.4% missing) and employment (only three categories:
full time, part time, none).
3. 2. Results
Table 7 presents the bivariate relationship between the two participation variables
available and both of my key IVs.

19

Voting

Participation

Agenda
congruence

-.051

-.135**

Ideological
congruence

.025

.127**

Technically IRP with WLSMV estimation and Theta parameterization, used interchangeably as above.
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Table 7. Linear relationship between ideological congruence, agenda congruence, and
participation. ** significant at a .01 level.

Voting is uncorrelated to both congruence measures – possibly due to its low
variance. On the other hand, people higher in ideological congruence appear to
participate more. The relationship is not strong with r=.127, but significant at a <.001
level, providing a good foundation for future analyses and lending partial support to H2a.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, agenda congruence is negatively related to institutional
participation, leading to the rejection of H1a.
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Table 8 shows the results of four models obtained by interacting agenda - and
ideological congruence with political interest in order to predict both DVs available.

b

Agenda
congruence
Political
interest

Voting
Β

p

Participation
b
β
p

.203
.034
(.161) (.027)

.206

-.495
(.137)

-.087
(.024)

<.001

.328
.287
(.038) (.030)

<.001

.530
(.025)

.481
(.021)

<.001

Agc*Polint

.037 -.005
(.272) (.034)

.891

-.256
(.179)

.033
(.023)

.155

Constant Model 1

.759
(.022)

.041

.038
(.019)

Model 1 R2

8.2%

<.001

Ideological
congruence
Political
interest

.147
.061
(.073) (.030)

.045

.336
.292
(.040) (.031)

Idc*Polint
Constant
Model 2 R2

.041
25.1%

<.001

.287
(.059)

.125
(.026)

<.001

<.001

.530
(.026)

.487
(.023)

<.001

-.105 .032
(.123) (.038)

.393

.208
(.076)

.067
(.025)

.006

-.747
(.023)

<.001

.043
(.020)

9%

<.001

.028
25.8%

<.001

Table 8. Predicting voting and institutional participation from agenda congruence, political interest,
and their interaction (Model1) as well as ideological congruence, political interest, and their
interaction (Model2).

As expected, neither voting model explains much of the variance with R squared
values of 8.2% and 9%, while institutional participation fares better at 25.1% and 25.8%.
Political interest emerges as the clear strongest predictor in all four models. Agenda
congruence appears to have no significant conditional effect on voting (while holding
political interest constant at its mean) and a negative effect on institutional participation,
while also not moderating the relationship between either DV and political interest. My
reservations about the validity of these results notwithstanding, I reject H1b and H1c.
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Ideological congruence, however, paints a different picture as it is a significant
positive predictor of both voting and participation, leading to the retention of H2b.
Hypothesis 2c, on the other hand, is only partially supported by the significance of the
interaction term between ideological congruence and political interest in one out of the
two cases – although this partial support is rather on the strong side due to the fact that it
is significant in the model with participation as the dependent variable. The positive
interaction suggests that the effect of political interest is stronger at higher values of
ideological congruence as represented in Figure 4.
2

Participation

1.5
1
High congruence

0.5

Low congruence

0
-0.5
-1

Political interest

Figure 4. Pattern of interaction between political interest and ideological congruence in predicting
institutional participation. The values for high and low congruence represent the upper and lower
deciles after centering (-1.52 for low and .48 for high congruence).

As expected, the relationship between political interest and participation remains
positive throughout. Its exact strength, however, depends on the value of ideological
congruence. At low levels, participation stays below average even for those with high
political interest. At high ideological congruence, on the other hand, participation is
above average for most levels of political interest and disproportionately so at higher
values. This moderation effect in the simple model is consistent with the theory put
forward in chapter one.
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The multivariate models for both dependent variables were constructed through
the above described process of step-by-step variable elimination. The final two show a
substantially different picture, which is why I decided to present them separately, starting
with voting whose R2 improved considerably with the addition of variables as the new
value of 19.0% signals.

Figure 5. Multivariate regression predicting voting. The arrows toward variables other than voting
represent indirect relationships in predicting voting (only paths with a beta above .015 are
included). All displayed weights are standardized (β), followed by their standard error and p value.

The relationship between ideological congruence and voting is clearly nonsignificant, while ideological congruence also does not moderate the relationship between
political interest and voting.20 It is noteworthy that agenda congruence remained a
significant negative predictor – compared to the simpler model – even after the addition
of all these controls and mediation effects.

20

The interaction term was dropped from the analysis due to non-significance in both the complex and the
simple models.
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Regarding the supplementary hypotheses, all of them (H3b-e and H4a-b) are
supported except H3a, rejected due to the significant direct positive relationship between
education and voting (the relationship of education mediated by SES is not represented in
Figure 5. but significant with β = .010, SE=.004, p=.011). The full model also included
two non-significant controls. age and gender (although the latter had a significant positive
effect moderated by political knowledge β =.036, SE= .008, p<.001), as well as religious
intensity, which had both a significant direct (β =.139, SE= .031, p<.001) effect and one
mediated by political knowledge (β = .080, SE= .014, p<.001)
The model for participation has also improved and now predicts 35.8% of the
total variance in the DV.

Figure 6. Multivariate regression predicting participation. The arrows toward variables other than
the DV represent indirect relationships (only paths with a beta above .015 are shown). All displayed
weights are standardized (β), followed by their standard error and p value.
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The null result in the case of agenda congruence and its interaction with political
interest, coupled with this variable’s negative effect in the previous model, lead to the
complete rejection of H1b and H1c. Conversely, Hypotheses 2b and 2c receive partial
support due to the significant positive direct conditional effect of ideological congruence
as well as the interaction term in this model. Similarly to the previous model, education
has a statistically significant positive effect on participation mediated by political interest,
political knowledge, social networks, and SES, resulting in the retention of H3b-e (the
indirect path through socio-economic status is not represented in Figure 6, but significant
with β = .007, SE= .003, p=.017). Due to this variable’s positive direct effect, however, I
reject Hypothesis 3a. Finally, both hypotheses concerning socio-economic status (H4a
and H4b) are fully supported based on this variable’s positive direct effect and that
mediated by political interest in both models.
The model also contained two variables not represented in Figure 6. Those with a
higher preference for traditional values in politics are more likely to participate: (β =.068
SE=.027, p=.011). Moreover, participation increases by .097 standard deviation
(SE=.027, p<.001) for every SD increase in ideological intensity.
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4. World Values Survey
I chose the World Values Survey and its Wave 6 in particular for two main reasons:
it provides splendid ideological coverage as well as massive cross-cultural comparison
potential containing 86274 individuals from 50 countries. As the analysis of the
Dimensions of Political Thinking dataset highlighted, there can be important differences
across countries or regions in several respects: how items relate to each other during the
construction of factors; how factors of ideology relate to one another (thus influencing
the ideological congruence variable); and most importantly, how the independent and
dependent variables relate to one another. For these reasons, I performed every analytical
step by country.21 I tested my hypotheses in five contexts: the U.S., Germany, Slovenia,
Japan, and South Africa.22 The choice of the United States was motivated by the potential
to compare my findings with those derived from other datasets. As neither Denmark nor
Hungary was part of Wave 6, I used Germany and Hungary as the closest available
proxies. Lastly, I added Japan and South Africa to provide a wide geographical coverage
and cross-cultural comparison potential.
All data were collected between 2010-2014, in each country by professional survey
organizations conducting face-to-face interviews and aiming for a representative national
sample of at least 1000 legal adults. Table 9 shows the key characteristics of the resulting
samples in the five countries selected.23

21

While the cultural and political homogeneity of certain countries is definitely debatable and I will be among
the first to question the logic and necessity of the nation state, they currently are the fundamental units of
politics (with national institutions, parliament, etc.) as well as national elections and other participatory
activities.
22
Neither Denmark (nor any other Scandinavian country) nor Hungary was part of Wave 6.
23
For
more
information
see
the
official
WVS
website
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=FieldworkSampling, accessed 05/02/2016
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Germany

Japan

Slovenia

South Africa

United
States

N

2046

2443

1068

3531

2232

Women%

50.4%

51.8%

57.9%

50%

51.4%

Age (SD)

49.48
(17.71)

50.74
(16.30)

49.5
(17.7)

36.67
(14.14)

48.91
(16.91)

Race

98% White
1.1% Asian
.9% Other

Not
measured

75.4% Black
1.9% White
1.3% Coloured
3.4% Indian

72.3% White
9.7% Black
12.2% Hisp.
5.8% Other

Not
measured

Table 9. Key characteristics of the five samples selected for analysis.

In addition to the variables shown in Table 9, the samples were also representative
for education (highest level attained). Based on these characteristics I decided to include
race only in the analyses of the samples from South Africa and the United States due to
lack of availability in Japan and Slovenia and negligible variance in Germany.
4. 1. Variables
The dataset contained two variables pertaining to two different contexts of voting:
in national as well as local elections. Both were frequency variables with three answer
options: 1=always, 2=usually, 3=never. The very high correlation between the two
(between .897 and .949 in all cases) seemed to indicate that they actually measured the
same construct – voting behavior – which is why I chose one of them, national voting.
The means and standard deviations of this variable are similar across countries with
values between 1.24-1.52 (SD≈.71). Its skewness shows more variation between -1.502
(Germany) and -.797 (South Africa), the relatively high negative values indicating either
the usual pattern of overreporting or genuinely high levels of voting.
Participation was only represented by five items, all related to the construct’s noninstitutional component with activities such as boycott, petition, or strikes. I ran the usual
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CFA models per country to construct a non-institutional participation factor. The
skewness of its score is slightly negative in Germany and the U.S. (-.102 and -.048,
respectively) and tends toward positive in Japan (.367), Slovenia (.165) and South Africa
(.346), showing somewhat higher than average participation for the ‘average individual’
in the former two and lower in the latter three while never straying too far from zero. The
correlation between voting and participation indicates an interesting pattern: it is wildly
significant (p<.001) in Germany, Japan, and the United States with r=.291, r=.297, and
r=.547, respectively. On the other hand, these two factors appear uncorrelated in both
Slovenia (r=.007, p=.851) and South Africa (r=.046, p=.115).
I performed the usual manipulation steps (separately in each country) in order to
arrive at my measure of ideological congruence. The factor structures of the five models
showed significant differences.24 At the same time, the factors of ideology and their
meaning was reasonably uniform across the five samples with the seven factors extracted
being: General welfare (income equality, state-run healthcare), Economic transgression
(justified to steal if hungry), Traditional values (same-sex marriage, abortion),
Xenophobia (would not like to have drunks, people of another religion as neighbors),
Misogyny (“If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause
problems”, men make better leaders), Democracy (support for democracy, the desirability
of this form of government), and Authoritarianism (obedience to authority and leaders).
In all cases, if a factor was not correlated enough with others (based on individual

24

To illustrate these with one example, the items that loaded on the Authoritarianism factor in most samples
did not appear to correspond to the same latent construct in the case of South Africa. Instead, some of them
teamed up with a few other items to form a new factor, Intergroup relations (war is justifiable, against illegal
immigration).
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correlations but also a threshold of at least .33 standardized contribution to the secondorder factor), it was removed from the computation of ideological congruence.
The resulting ideological congruence variable varied markedly by country, with
means (and SDs) of 4.905 (1.699) in Germany, 5.067 (1.705) in Japan, 6.026 (1.833) in
Slovenia, 7.589 (2.908) in South Africa, and 4.997 (1.867) in the U.S.; the mean
differences being chiefly due to the differences in item and factor numbers. The
variable’s skewness ranged between .388 and 1.032, these positive values indicating
lower than average incongruence for most participants.
With regards to politics, the WVS dataset contained several variables I turned into
factors including Political interest and three ‘Trust variables’ related to different types of
institutions: political, non-political (military, police, courts) and the NGO sector. I also
constructed factors using a few personal and network-related variables such as Use of
traditional (tv, newspaper) as well as non-traditional information sources (email,
internet), Religiosity and Socio-economic status (measured with two variables, one direct
and one tapping social class identity).
4. 2. Results
Table 10 summarizes the bivariate linear relationship between the lone IV,
ideological congruence, and the two dependent variables in each country.

Germany

Japan

Slovenia

South
Africa

United
States

Voting (national)
Participation

0.171
0.091
-0.030*
-0.038*
0.234
0.273
0.219
0.221
0.136
0.173
Table 10. Linear relationship between ideological congruence and participation in all five countries.
* signifies correlations NOT significant at a .01 level.

The table reveals encouraging results. Participation is positively correlated with
ideological congruence at an approximately .2 level across the board (substantially
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weaker in South Africa and stronger in Germany). Voting’s case is somewhat different
with the correlations being reasonably strong in the U.S. and Germany, weak in Japan
and non-existent in Slovenia and South Africa. For the most part, these bivariate results
are significant and none run in the opposite direction, lending strong partial (almost full)
support to Hypothesis 2a. The next step, interacting ideological congruence with
participation, will be presented in the usual format, only this time broken down by
country.
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Voting
b

Germany

β

P

b

Β

p

Ideological .046
congruence (.009)
Political
.286
(.02)
interest

.111
(.022)

<.001

.114
(.011)

.222
(.021)

<.001

.368
(.028)

<.001

.288
(.023)

.301
(.021)

<.001

Idc*Polint

-.019
(.012)

-.050
(.027)

.061

.013
(.011)

.026
(.023)

.252

Constant

.050
(.020)

.725

-.016
(.023)

R2

Japan

<.001

17.1% (.014)

<.001

.062
(.02)

.002

.088
(.008)

.194
(.018)

<.001

.322
(.019)

<.001

.289
(.019)

.280
(.018)

<.001

Idc*Polint

-.017
(.010)

-.034
(.019)

.075

.022
(.011)

.036
(.018)

.047

Constant

-.107
(.016)

<.001

-.006
(.016)

12.2% (.013)

<.001

.728

12.4% (.012)

<.001

Ideological -.021
congruence (.011)
Political
.177
(.023)
interest

-.058
(.029)

.051

.092
(.013)

.2
(.027)

<.001

.239
(.03)

<.001

.157
(.028)

.168
(.03)

<.001

Idc*Polint

.011
(.012)

.027
(.03)

.367

-.01
(.013)

-.021
(.027)

.435

Constant

.017
(.02)

.413

.061
(.025)

5.8%% (.015)

<.001

R2

South
Africa

14.6% (.016)

.925

Ideological .024
congruence (.008)
Political
.293
(.018)
interest

R2

Slovenia

Participation

.016

7.7% (.015)

<.001

Ideological -.011
congruence (.005)
Political
.118
(.013)
interest

-.04
(.017)

.022

.037
(.004)

.132
(.016)

<.001

.16
(.017)

<.001

.168
(.013)

.219
(.016)

<.001

.012
(.004)

.046
(.017)

.008

-.01
(.004)

-.036
(.016)

.019

Idc*Polint
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Constant
R2

United
States

-.006
(.013)

.653

2.9% (.006)

.001

.039
(.013)

.003

6.9% (.008)

<.001

Ideological .066
congruence (.008)
Political
.357
(.016)
interest

.159
(.02)

<.001

.047
(.009)

.101
(.02)

<.001

.441
(.018)

<.001

.372
(.019)

.407
(.018)

<.001

Idc*Polint

-.007
(.009)

-.016
(.021)

.453

-.022
(.010)

-.046
(.021)

.026

Constant

.001
(.015)

.945

.016
(.017)

R2

24.5% (.017)

.001

19.6% (.016)

.348
<.001

Table 11. Multivariate regression predicting voting and participation from ideological congruence,
political interest and their interaction.

The variance predicted by these three variables only is substantially lower
compared to the results obtained in previous datasets, with decent values in the United
States, Germany and Japan, but low (albeit significant) ones in South Africa and
Slovenia. Political interest is the strongest predictor across the board as indicated by its β
weight. In most cases with some exceptions (most notably South Africa), ideological
congruence is not lagging far behind, having a significant conditional positive effect on
both voting and participation, holding political interest constant at its mean. These results
almost fully support Hypothesis 2b. The interaction term approaches statistical
significance in several cases but only reaches it in four: it is significantly positive when
predicting participation in Japan and voting in South Africa, and significantly negative
when predicting participation in South Africa and the United States; lending rather weak
partial support to H2c.
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Low congruence (Idc factors)

Participation

1

High congruence (Idc factors

0.5
0
-0.5
-1

Political interest

Figure 7. Pattern of interaction between political interest and ideological congruence in predicting
participation in the United States. The values of ideological congruence represented approximate
the upper and lower deciles (-2.483 for low and 2.217 for high congruence).

The pattern shown in Figure 7 differs from what we observed in Figure 4 in that the
two lines appear to converge instead of diverging as values of political interest increase.
As expected, the positive relationship between political interest and participation holds
across the board. Its degree also depends on the level of ideological congruence.
However, the difference between those high and low in ideological congruence shrinks at
higher values of political interest, as opposed to starting from close and proceeding to
move apart. While this result supports part of the original hypothesis (significant
moderation), its pattern differs from my initial expectations.
Overall, these results are encouraging with the interaction term showing a 4/10
success rate and ideological congruence retaining its significance in most of these simple
models. Its occasional low weight, however, signals caution. The relatively low R2s
encountered also warn us that there may be many other factors at play, whose effect can
only be uncovered in a multivariate framework. I started the process of getting there by
employing the customary process of step-by-step elimination to all ten models with the
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exception of ideological congruence, the interaction term if found significant in the
simple models, and key demographic controls sex, age, education and race where
applicable. The outcome was a unique multivariate regression model for both dependent
variables in all five countries, each with its own set of predictors, as well as moderation
and mediation effects. In order to aid reader comprehension, I will deviate from the norm
followed in the rest of this dissertation and present these results in two steps, starting with
a summary table of all models, followed by a visual representation of three selected out
of the total ten.
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Germany

Japan

Slovenia

South
Africa

United
States

DV

Voting
(national)

Participation

Number of
significant direct
predictors

9

12

Idc: β (SE), p, rank

.059 (.025),
p=.018, 8th

.052 (.026),
p=.046, 11th

R2

23.6%

31.3%

Number of
significant direct
predictors

10

10

Idc: β (SE), p, rank

.057 (.027),
p=.035, 7th

.101 (.026),
p<.001, 4th

R2

21.9%

14.8%

Number of
significant direct
predictors

5

7

Idc: β (SE), p, rank

.015 (.032),
p=.629

.027 (.029),
p=.354

14.7%

24.5%

10

11

-.004 (.018),
p=.814

.134 (.017),
p<.001, 3rd

20.9%

26.8%

8

14

Idc: β (SE), p, rank

-.009 (.024),
p=.721

.059 (.024),
p=.014, 10th

R2

35.5%

32.6%

R2
Number of
significant direct
predictors
Idc: β (SE), p, rank
R2
Number of
significant direct
predictors

Table 12. Summary of the models predicting voting and non-institutional participation. In the case
of ideological congruence, rank indicates the relative strength of its beta weight in the ranking of
all significant predictors in the model.

As Table 12 shows, ideological congruence is a significant positive predictor in six
out of ten cases while usually ranking toward the lower end, partially corroborating
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Hypothesis 2b. The case of voting in South Africa is especially interesting because here
ideological congruence has no direct conditional effect but still plays a role by
moderating the relationship of political interest on the dependent variable. The interaction
between political interest and ideological congruence remains significant in the cases of
voting in Japan (β=-.046, SE=.021, p=.032) and South Africa (β=.058, SE=.017, p=.001),
as well as participation in the latter country (β=-.032, SE=.015, p=.033); thus lending
weak partial support to H2c.
Also notable is the significantly increased general predictive power (if compared to
the simple models), which still remains rather low if we compare the model R2s to those
in other extended path models. I will present three models in more detail: voting in Japan
and participation in South Africa and the United States. All three models have a decent
R2 and include a significant effect of ideological congruence, allowing me to show what
variables it does not compete with in these countries.
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Figure 8. Multivariate regression predicting voting in Japan. The arrows pointed toward variables
other than voting represent indirect relationships. All displayed weights are standardized (β),
followed by their standard error and p value. The arrow starting from ideological congruence
pointed at the arrow representing the relationship between political interest and voting indicates the
interaction term.

As we already knew from the previous table, ideological congruence is not only a
significant positive direct conditional predictor of voting in Japan, but also moderates the
relationship between political interest and the dependent variable, although it does so
with a negative coefficient. Regarding the supplementary hypotheses, H3a, H3b and H3e
are confirmed by education’s (lack of) direct, as well as mediated effects. I was not able
to test H3c due to the lack of political knowledge variables in the set. H3d, on the other
hand, is rejected for lack of mediation by SES between education and voting. Both
hypotheses that include socio-economic status are supported by the variable’s direct
positive effect (H4a) as well as that mediated by political interest (H4b). In addition to
these results, Figure 8 also shows that – not surprisingly – those who have more trust in
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political institutions (an important control, see chapter one) and those who support
democracy (an ideology factor) are more likely to vote in Japan.
The other two models I present share the dependent variable and both have a large
number of predictors involved, leading me to opt for a more comparison-friendly table
format instead of a path diagram.
Participation - South Africa

Participation - United
States

b

Β

p

B

β

P

Political interest

.078
(.013)

.103
(.017)

<.001

.286
(.020)

.314
(.022)

<.001

Ideological
congruence

.037
(.005)

.134
(.017)

<.001

.027
(.011)

.059
(.024)

.014

Idc*Polint

-.009
(.004)

-.032
(.015)

.033

.009
(.010)

.017
(.02)

.394

Info gathering (trad
sources)

.173
(.017)

.235
(.022)

<.001

.065
(024)

.074
(.027)

.006

Info gathering
(online)

-

-

-

.095
(.021)

.097
(.022)

<.001

Trust in political
institutions
Trust in nonpolitical
institutions

.063
(.013)

.087
(.018)

.008

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.196
(.056)

-.173
(.048)

<.001

Trust in NGOs

-

-

-

.243
(.033)

.221
(.029)

<.001

Support for
democracy

.083
(.015)

.096
(.017)

<.001

.056
(.018)

.134
(.043)

.002

State-run welfare

-

-

-

.051
(.018)

.053
(.018)

.004

Welfare-related
transgression
justified

-

-

-

.076
(.022)

.084
(.024)

.001

Xenophobia

-

-

-

-.069
(.023)

-.053
(.018)

.003

Authoritarianism

-

-

-

-.053
(.019)

-.118
(.042)

.005
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Religiosity

.212
(.014)

.230
(.120)

.056

-

-

-

Gender

-.065
(.026)

-.04
(.016)

.013

-.007
(.034)

-.004
(.02)

.833

SES (possessions)

.212
(.014)

.282
(.018)

<.001

.091
(.026)

.088
(.025)

<.001

Age

-.003
(.001)

-.046
(.017)

.007

0
(.001)

0
(.023)

.996

Education

.012
(.009)

.024
(.018)

.191

.069
(.017)

.096
(024)

<.001

Black vs White

-.303
(.046)

-.116
(.018)

<.001

-

-

-

Hispanic vs White

-

-

-

-.125
(.061)

-.043
(.021)

.043

Constant

.208
(.047)

<.001

-.020
(.031)

R2

26.8% (.015)

<.001

32.6% (.021)

.506
<.001

Table 13. Multivariate regression models predicting non-institutional participation in South Africa
and the United States. All effects included are direct (non-mediated).

H3a is partially supported because education does not have a direct positive
conditional effect on participation in the United States, but does in South Africa. H4a, on
the other hand, is fully supported by the positive conditional effect of socio-economic
status in both countries. Moreover, those who show higher support for democracy in
general also demonstrate higher participation levels in both countries, as do those with a
higher trust in institutions in South Africa. It is worth noting that ‘liberal’ individuals
seem more likely to participate only in the United States, based on a few significant
ideology factors.25

25

Here they were not recoded in a uniform fashion. All values in the table are in sync with the statement
(those falling on the more ‘liberal’ end of each factor show higher participation).
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Participation South Africa
b

β

Education --> Political interest

Participation United States
B

Β

.031
(.005)

.043
(.007)

Education --> Social networks

-

-

.011
(.003)

.059
(.024)

Education --> SES

.029
(.003)

.060
(.006)

.019
(.006)

.026
(.008)

SES --> Political interest

.011
(.002)

.015
(.003)

.024
(.009)

.023
(.009)

Gender --> Political interest

-.018
(.004)

-.011
(.003)

-.087
(.012)

-050
(.007)

Gender --> Trust in NGOs

-

-

.022
(.009)

.047
(.01)

Table 14. Selected mediation effects in predicting non-institutional participation in South Africa
and the United States, respectively. All effects are significant at a <.001 level.

Of the mediation hypotheses I was able to test, H3b and H3d receive partial support
thanks to the mediation of political interest and social networks between education and
participation in the United States (but not South Africa). H3e and H4b are fully supported
due to SES’s corresponding mediation, as well as political interest’s mediating role of the
relationship between SES and participation in both countries. The last three rows of Table
14 represent two additional mediation effects not included in hypotheses. Women’s
generally lower political interest seems to have a negative effect on their participation in
both countries. Conversely, their higher trust in NGOs raises participation in the United
States (with no direct effect observed in either case).
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS DERIVED FROM DATASETS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR THIS DISSERTATION
The goal of this chapter is to clarify the relationships outlined above through the use
of three datasets specifically designed for this project – with special regard to agenda and
ideological congruence. Development of the survey was based on the variables outlined
in chapters one and two, with minor improvements following each subsequent set. I
obtained the approval of the Institutional Review Board at the University of NebraskaLincoln under the IRB number of 20151015498EP (project ID: 15498, working title:
Politics in Focus).

1. Political Science Experimental Participant Pool – Round One
The first wave of data collection took place in the Fall semester of the 2015-2016
academic year, relying on the Political Science Experimental Participant Pool (PSEPP) at
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. All respondents were students enrolled in
introductory political science classes and were recruited through the Department of
Political Science’s own system for administering surveys. Respondents received research
credit in exchange for their participation. The questionnaire itself was located on the
survey platform Qualtrics.
I employed two primary means26 to ensure data quality. First, I included two
attention questions (“Please click on 'important' (this is a control question)”; “This
question is testing if you are paying attention, please mark "once"), correct response
being a necessary condition for continuation in both cases. Second, I used a validation

26

On top of the two presented, the survey also included two self-reported English proficiency items.
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option provided by Qualtrics to make sure participants provided a response to all my key
variables.27 After removing a few faulty or questionable datapoints (those with duplicate
PSEPP numbers, for instance), the resulting final dataset had N=181 cases.
The age of the sample ranges between 18 and 35, concentrated around its mean of
19.66 (SD=2.106). The analyzed final sample contains 71 freshmen, 64 sophomores, with
only 26 juniors and 20 seniors in the mix. Age is not the only variable with very little
variance compared to that present in the general population: out of the 181 respondents
166 identified themselves as white (91.7%). Gender distribution, on the other hand, was
almost balanced with 81 females (44.8%).
1. 1. Variables and Univariate Results
Voting was measured using one item, frequency in recent elections on a five-point
scale. The variable has a strong negative skew of -1.042, which, coupled with a mean of
3.99 (SD=1.329), indicates that students in the sample generally reported a very high
level of voting. The validity of this measure, however, may be compromised due to a
mistake that went unnoticed: I did not add a ‘wasn’t old enough yet’ answer option,
meaning those to whom that would have applied in all probability ended up in the ‘none’
category.
Regarding the other forms of participation, the final model has acceptable fit with
an RMSEA of .061 (.049-.072, below 0.05 with a 6.1% chance) and a CFI of .889. The
first factor contains elements pertaining to both institutional and non-institutional
participation. The second factor, online participation summarizes eight items representing

27

In accordance with general IRB regulations and ethical principles, respondents were given the option of
discontinuing participation at any time while incurring no penalty.
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different aspects of participation in the online environment such as liking political posts
or creating politically relevant content. Univariate examination (based on their skewness
varying between 1.343 and 1.553) of the resulting factor scores reveals that, in general,
members of this sample do not participate much in forms other than voting. The two
participation variables are highly correlated with each other at r=.847 (p<.001), while
voting correlates moderately with participation (r=.241, p=.001) and rather weakly with
online participation (r=.165, p=.027).
Agenda congruence was computed as outlined in chapter two. The resulting
variable, tapping the difference between participants’ own and the elite’s real agenda,
ranges between 0-2.35 with a mean of 1.654 (SD=.298) and a skewness indicator of .036.
I obtained the ideological factor scores through a series of models relying on
modification indices, fit indices, and residual correlations, until I arrived at a well-fitting
model with only three factors and an RMSEA of .063 (95% between .046 and .081 with a
1.2% chance of it being below .05), coupled with a CFI of .922. The first factor contains
seven items pertaining to Progressive values (media bias, college costs, homelessness).
Conversely, the second, Equality factor has only three: racial equality (standardized
loading: .768), climate change (.319), and gender equality (.839). The third and final,
Welfare and liberties factor summarizes six items such as: increasing welfare spending,
abortion, illegal immigration, and same-sex marriage. The factor intercorrelations seem
to support (albeit weakly) the viability of a three-factor structure with levels of .39
(progressive values and equality), .424 (equality and welfare), and .410 (progressive
values and welfare). Nevertheless, the picture painted by these three factors (one of
which has very few variables) is different from the six-factor spread.
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The construction of my ideological congruence measure relying on these factor
scores followed the pattern described in chapter two: I subtracted their rescaled forms
from rescaled second-order scores and took the average of the differences for each
participant. The resulting variable is close to normally distributed with a range between 0
and 1.66, and a mean of .606 (SD=.322). It does not appear highly correlated with agenda
congruence with r=.161 (p=.030), indicating little competition for the same portion of the
DVs’ variance.
Regarding other political constructs, I extracted factor scores using CFA wherever
applicable in order to obtain well-behaved and representative aggregate variables. The
first of these factors clearly taps Interest in politics (i.e. “How interested are you in
politics and public affairs?” or “Politics is boring.”. The second, (politicized) Social
networks relates to how friends and family, as well as the individual feels about politics.
Four items tapping civic duty and efficacy lined up reasonably well (“It is every citizen’s
duty to vote”/”I'd be more politically engaged but I feel like what I do doesn't make a
difference.”) to form one, Political efficacy factor. Similarly, income, job status, and
economic status formed an SES factor with acceptably high loadings. Moreover, I
extracted an additional factor to measure Stress preference (“How much do you enjoy
stressful situations?”), a product of four related items. Finally, demographic controls as
detailed above – sex, age, year in college, race – were also available.
Before moving on to quantitative results, let me give a few examples to demonstrate
a qualitative aspect of ideological incongruence, and to show that it exists in participants’
minds, is accessible to conscious awareness, and appears considerably well-reasoned in
some cases. The following were responses to the open-ended prompt described in chapter
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two, asking participants to explain their choice on the self-reported congruence measure,
taken verbatim from the survey and organized by answer category.
1= Very well, I have no difficulty placing myself along the scale and it accurately
represents my views:


I have taken many political identity tests and know my place on the scale.



I agree with most everything that the conservative part of our society agrees
with.



I was raised by a liberal family in a very conservative state. I’ve had to battle
for my political beliefs my entire life. I know what I’m talking about and
I’ve held my own while being pounded with conservative views.



Libertarian28

2=Reasonably well:


Because it somewhat explains why my opinions/beliefs are what they are,
but doesn't fully explain them.



I have some views that are considered liberal, but overall I am more of a
conservative person.



I believe in smaller federal government and more power in the individual
states' hands. I am against many of the more radical ideologies and believe
in the motto "everything in moderation". However, I am also neutral on
many policies or even lean slightly more liberal than conservative on some
issues as well.

28

Evidently, what may seem contradictory to political scientists makes sense to at least some of their subjects.
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3=Not too well


Because I am so middle of the road nowadays due to the huge divide in both
parties.



Don't agree entirely with one side in almost all issues.



Liberalism is at a cross roads in term of economic policies. Many Liberal
are going further economically left towards Socialism now than before. I
much more prefer to Label myself a Hamiltonian Progressive.



I feel that when placing a "scale" on what a persons views are on certain
topics, it is more complex than simply saying "I am more so a
liberal/conservative." It depends on the topics, for example I tend to see
both sides of arguments or attempt to and try to see where a middle ground
could be met for opposing sides. Many of the issues that we have today,
need solving from both liberals and conservatives to an extent.

4= Not at all, the way I think about politics is entirely different.


I have my own views on certain issues and they fall under the common good
for humanity. We as humans have our own right to our lives and I think
that my views don't directly fall under a certain category.



I just don't think that we can label someone and put them into one small
category. Personally, I have many different views on a lot of different
topics. I am registered as a Republican but I have a lot of Democratic views.
I just don't like labeling such broad list of things.



I think decisions should be made based on facts and empirical data as
opposed to sentiment, dogma, and the opinion of uneducated voters.
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This dichotomous dimension only works within our current political system
and doesn't leave room for alternate forms of government.

1. 2. Results
Voting

Participation

Online
participation

Agenda
congruence

-.071

-.242**

-.257**

Ideological
congruence

.003

-.182*

-.187*

Table 15. Linear relationship between agenda congruence, ideological congruence, and
participation. * denotes a correlation significant at a .05, and ** at a .01 level.

The bivariate results presented in Table 15 work in a direction opposite to my
expectations without exception. The negative findings regarding traditional and online
participation are even more surprising than their non-significant counterparts (with
respect to voting), especially in light of the results presented in chapter three. Their
consistency, leads to the categorical rejection of H1 and H2 and foreshadows
corresponding expectations for multivariate hypotheses, the first round of which is
summarized in Table 16 below.
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Voting

Participation

Online participation

b

β

p

b

β

p

b

β

p

.405
(.349)

.091
(.078)

.247

-.518
(.183)

-.164
(.057)

.004

-.564
(.059)

-.178
(.054)

.001

.176
(.104)

.127
(.074)

.084

.575
(.056)

.590
.606
<.001
(.043)
(.059)

.619
<.001
(.044)

Agc*Polint

.170
(.318)

.042
(.079)

.594

-.330
(.159)

-.116
(.055)

-.153
(.059)

Constant Model 1

.007
(.097)

.943

-.013
(.054)

Agenda
congruence
Political
interest

2

R - Model 1
Ideological
congruence
Political
interest

2.3% (.023)

.312

41.1% (.051)

.035

-.437
(.168)

.802

-.018
(.052)

<.001

.735

46.3% (.052)

.001
(.071)

.987

-.332
(.156)

-.113
(.055)

.167
(.107)

.121
(.076)

.117

.585
(.063)

.600
.607
<.001
(.043)
(.064)

.620
<.001
(.045)

Idc*Polint

.133
(.323)

.032
(.077)

.680

.069
(.174)

.023
(.058)

-.055
(.069)

Constant Model 2

.005
(.099)

.957

.003
(.057)

R2 - Model 2

1.4% (.018)

.420

38.5% (.050)

.693

-.162
(.201)

.964

-.007
(.055)

<.001

-.090
(.060)

<.001

.005
(.295)

.033

-.266
(.176)

.009

42.5% (.054)

.130

.420
.904
<.001

Table 16. Multivariate regression predicting participation from agenda congruence, political
interest, and their interaction (Model 1) as well as ideological congruence, political interest, and
their interaction (Model 2).

In light of previous results, the very low R2 of the voting models should come as no
surprise. The first key independent variable represented in them, agenda congruence,
appears to be a significant conditional negative predictor of participation and online
participation with no effect on voting. Furthermore, it moderates the effect of political
interest in the same two models as before, but does so with a negative coefficient. Based
on these results, I reject both H1b and H1c.29 Ideological congruence only reaches

29

In such cases where there is moderation but the core relationship does not correspond to my expectations,
I will not present the interaction.
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significance as a conditional predictor (at the mean of political interest) of traditional
participation and even there its coefficient is negative, lending no support to H2b.
Moreover, it also does not appear to moderate the relationship between political interest
and the three forms of participation tested, resulting in the rejection of H2c as well.
Voting
b
.354
(.362)

β
.078
(.079)

-.013
(.276)

-.003
(.066)

Political
interest

.250
(.103)

Agc*Polint

Agenda
congruence
Ideological
congruence

Progressive
values
Civic
duty/efficacy
Semesters
Religiosity
SES
Gender
Constant
R2

Participation
b
-.543
(.177)

β
-.169
(.053)

.963

-.180
(.151)

-.061
(.053)

.181
(.072)

.012

.539
(.053)

.554
.480
<.001
(.042)
(.076)

.491
<.001
(.066)

-

-

-

-.381
(.146)

-.135
(.051)

.008

-.512
(.158)

-.180
(.056)

.001

-

-

-

-

-

-

.140
(.049)

.134
(.047)

.005

-

-

-

.151
(.065)
-.016
(.026)

.142
(.059)
-.037
(.061)

.117
(.058)
.011
(024)

.109
(.054)
.027
(.055)

-

-

-

-

.149
.249
(.044) (.074)
.282
.204
(.098) (.069)
.052
.032
(.110) (.069)
-.170
-.083
(.097) (.070)
-.001
(.071)
12.8% (.048)

p

Online participation

.329

.001
.003
.637
.237
.985
.007

p
.001
.250

.016
.547
-

b
-.432
(.171)

β
-.134
(.052)

-.493
(.199)

-.167
(.068)

p
.010
.015

.042
.631
-

-.196
-.175
-.111
-.098
.001
.078
(063) (.053)
(.066) (.056)
-.046
-.024
-.032
-.017
.651
.745
(.102) (.054)
(.098) (.051)
-.005
.086
.941
.133
(.070)
(.057)
45.7% (.050) <.001 51.9% (.052) <.001

Table 17. Multivariate regression predicting all three forms of participation.

The results pertaining to my core hypotheses reveal a similar pattern to that
described above. Agenda congruence has no direct main effect on voting and a negative
one on the other two dependent variables, (controlling for all other variables at their
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mean), leading to the rejection of H1b. The second relevant hypothesis, 1c is also rejected
based on the significant but negative interaction between agenda congruence and political
interest in predicting traditional and online participation, compounded by no effect on
voting. Ideological congruence’s case is even simpler: it does not appear to moderate the
relationship between political interest and any form of participation, and boasts only one
significant main effect on online participation, which runs in the direction opposite to
what I hypothesized. Therefore, I reject H2b and H2c. With respect to supplementary
hypotheses, H3a is rather strongly supported by no significant main effect of education
except in the case of voting. The very same factors may explain the lack of mediation
between education and participation by political interest, social networks, and socioeconomic status, a result which culminates in the rejection of H3b, H3d and H3e.
Furthermore, H4a is completely rejected due to SES’ one significant negative effect on
participation, and no direct one on the other two variables. Socio-economic status also
does not mediate the relationship between political interest and participation (for
example, in the case of traditional participation β = -.016, SE=.014, p=.265) refuting
H4b.
My sample’s limitations, as well as those of ideological congruence (recall the
issues surrounding the construction of the original variables and the factors alike) still
leave open several questions regarding the validity of these results, and make it clear that
additional data gathering was warranted. I will present the outcome of this process in
section two.

97

2. Political Science Experimental Research Pool – Round Two
The dataset used in this section is very similar to the previous one with a few
notable exceptions. I once again relied on UNL’s PSEPP pool, this time in the Spring
semester of the 2015-2016 academic year. Respondents were still students in introductory
political science classes. The most important and major change regarding the survey was
the measurement of ideology. I expanded the list of ideological items to 44 items – the
additions having been lifted from the pool of well-functioning items used by Feher et al.
(2014) – and modified the item wordings (changing short expressions to complete
statements) to aid the interpretation of scale points. In addition, I also added some agenda
items and political variables to improve their respective coverage.
After the elimination of responses with too many missing variables and the three
participants who admitted that their level of English was not sufficient, the final sample
proved rather small with N=140. The age of the sample varies between 18 and 35 with
the mean being 20.06 (SD=2.065). The skewness of 3.534 (SE=.206) indicates a very
heavy focus on younger individuals as was expected (in fact, 72.7% of the total N were
20 or younger). Correspondingly, the majority were toward the beginning of their college
career with 56 freshmen, 41 sophomores and only 22 juniors coupled with 21 seniors.
Race showed more variance compared to the previous sample but still quite little overall
with 87.1% identifying as white, 5.7% Asian (8 students), 3.6% Black as well as
Hispanic, and 1.4% Native American. The gender distribution was acceptable with 37.9%
women.
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2. 1. Variables
I began the process of variable preparation with a confirmatory factor analysis of all
participation-related variables. The final model has reasonably good fit with an RMSEA
of .062 (95% between .047-.077 and with a 9.2% chance of being lower than .05) and a
CFI of .918. The two factors of traditional and online participation correlate with each
other at a comfortable .820 level (p<.001), justifying their separate treatment but at the
same time signaling their relatedness. The relationship between voting and the two forms
of participation is also practically identical to that presented in section one with r=.261
(p=.010) and r=.200 (p=.018), respectively. The skewness indicators once again show
that most respondents demonstrate remarkably low participation (2.223 for traditional
and 1.863 for online) as well as very high voting (-1.558) levels.
The procedure I used to construct the agenda congruence variable was also
analogous to that presented in section one. The resulting variable appears close to
normally distributed with a < .6 skewness indicator. As customary, the construction of
the ideological congruence measure started with a series of confirmatory factor analyses
on all items available. The results closely approximate those found by Feher et al. (2014)
as the final factor structure contains those and only those present in the original article,
namely: Intergroup relations, Treatment of rulebreakers, Traditional values, (state-run)
Welfare, Strong central government, and ‘Big Brother’ (government monitoring). The
final model’s fit is satisfactory with an RMSEA of .066 (95% CIs: .059-.074) and a CFI
of .836. The factor intercorrelations are encouraging as they vary between .289-.806. This
is also reflected in the loadings of the second-order factor which range between .468 and
.943. The final ideological congruence measure has a considerable positive skew (1.211),
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indicating relatively low levels of incongruence in the sample. Moreover, as in section
one, the survey included an open-ended question asking for explanations immediately
following participants’ own self-reported congruence measure (“Please briefly explain
your choice”). Below is a sample of explanations organized by answer choice – as above,
in unedited form.
1= Very well, I have no difficulty placing myself along the scale and it accurately
represents my views.


I am both socially and economically liberal, so the label of liberal fits me
well.



I'm generally socially moderate and fiscally conservative.



I almost always agree with the typical beliefs for a liberal.



I find myself viewing things a republican does as well as my views are
definitely views of a republican

2=Reasonably well.


I have a few liberal tendencies, including a belief that same sex marriage
should be protected by law, and that while welfare spending should be cut
back, I do not favor removing it completely.



It's easy for me. But I know of moderates who hate this scale.



I am more liberal on some issues than others. I am more socially liberal than
economically liberal.



I feel that the two party system allows most people, including myself, to
find specific positions within the conservative-liberal dimension that go
along with their beliefs.

100


I think that to much is focused in the wrong area if you conservative you
must be against gay-marriage and so forth but to me it doesn't belong in
politics.

3=Not too well.


I identify more as libertarian than conservative, although I believe the term
"conservative" used to be representative of the principles of the Founding
Fathers, but if they were alive today, I believe they would agree most with
the principles of libertarans. I fall between the two categories.



I don't see the need to be categorized into liberal or conservative. I think
that if you believe in something then you should vote that way no matter
what side the idea comes from.



There is more to beliefs than three classifications.



I have some ideas about fiscal policy that don't exactly align with liberal
thinking usually.



Politics should be viewed as a compass, not a line.



I may lean Republican in some regards, but I'm not nearly as rule/religion
oriented as they are. Criminal justice reform, legalization of marijuana,
separation of church and state, equal rights, global warming, there are many
different issues I diverge frm the status quo on. The title is very misleading.

4= Not at all, the way I think about politics is entirely different)


Currently, liberals are associated with strong arm, large, overreaching
governments, and as a liberal, I identify with the ideals for social and
business freedoms, without government intervention.
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I weigh in the pro and cons for both side rather than one



I consider myself a Theodore Roosevelt-style Progressive Imperialist,
having political beliefs that align both with 'conservatives' (I am in favor of
a strong foreign policy) and 'liberals' (I also support a fully-developed social
democracy).



I don't really care about politics.



Politics isn't just a black and white system, I agree with stances on different
issues in both parties, and sometimes don't agree with anyone.



Currently, liberals are associated with strong arm, large, overreaching
governments, and as a liberal, I identify with the ideals for social and
business freedoms, without government intervention.

Using a host of other relevant variables, I obtained the following additional factors
(each within a well-fitting model): Political interest (How interested are you in
politics?/Politics is boring), Politicized social networks (How do you think the majority
of your family members feel about politics in general?), Political efficacy (I'd be more
politically engaged but I feel like what I do doesn't make a difference), Trust in partisan
institutions (Please indicate how much you trust the House, Senate, political parties), and
Trust in non-partisan institutions (Please indicate how much you trust the police, the
military, etc.). In addition to this set, I also have two variables tapping Civic duty (It is
every citizen’s civic duty to vote./ It is every citizen’s civic duty to actively try to
influence societal decisions.) at my disposal. On the non-political front I have available a
factor tapping Stress tolerance (How much do you enjoy stressful situations/How hard do
you try to avoid stressful situations?), Socio-economic status (income and subjective
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economic position), Religious attendance, and Religious guidance in everyday life, as
well as the usual demographics age, gender, year (as a stand-in for education), and race.
2. 2. Results
Voting

Participation

Online
participation

Agenda
congruence

.069

-.278**

-.128

Ideological
congruence

.111

-.042

-.186*

Table 18. Linear relationship between agenda congruence, ideological congruence, and
participation. *denotes a correlation significant at a .05, and ** at a .01 level.

Voting appears uncorrelated with both congruence variables, although it is worth
noting that the correlation with ideological congruence (with p=.191) is most likely nonsignificant due to a power problem. The same can be said regarding the size of the
correlation between agenda congruence and online participation (p=.131). These power
issues notwithstanding, all significant coefficients presented in Table 18 are negative,
meaning that the only two significant ones run in the opposite to hypothesized direction,
resulting in the rejection of both H1a and H2a.
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Voting

Agenda
congruence
Political
interest
Agc*Polint
Constant Model1
R2 - Model 1
Ideological
congruence
Political
interest
Idc*Polint
Constant Model 2
2

R - Model 2

Participation

Online participation

b

β

p

b

β

p

b

β

p

.342
(.445)

.064
(.084)

.441

-.755
(.238)

-.224
(.060)

.002

-.276
(.244)

-.084
(.074)

.258

.527
(.125)
.625
(.507)
.007
(.121)

.329
.469
<.001
(.076)
(.082)
.101
-.750
.218
(.083)
(.466)
-.009
.951
(.066)

12.1% (.056)
.818
(.332(
.543
(.123)
-.224
(.390)
-.008
(.118)

.032

33% (.097)

.174
.281
.014
(.072)
(.201)
.339
.482
<.001
(.075)
(.089)
-.050
-.522
.566
(.088)
(.263)
-.020
.943
(.068)

12.9% (.049)

.008

.460
.517
<.001
(.074)
(.082)
-.191
-.475
.077
(.108)
(.365)
-.006
.880
(.066)
<.001

.001

.929

30.2% (.081)

.094
-.066
.162
(.068)
(.201)
.473
.502
<.001
(.072)
(.077)
-.185
-.659
.026
(.083)
(.214)
-.025
0.77
(.064)

25.6% (.077)

.518
<.001
(.065)
-.123
.193
(.091)

<.001

-.022
.745
(.069)
.503
<.001
(.064)
-.238
.001
(.075)

33.8% (.081)

.700
<.001

Table 19. Multivariate regression predicting the three forms of participation from agenda
congruence, political interest, and their interaction (Model 1), as well as ideological congruence,
political interest, and their interaction (Model 2).

Agenda congruence retained its significance in this simple multivariate model,
disconfirming H1b. Moreover, it does not appear to moderate the relationship between
political interest and participation (although it comes reasonably close in traditional
participation’s case, albeit in the wrong direction), once again refuting H1c. Moving on to
ideological congruence, the first observation is that it has a positive conditional effect
only on voting, lending weak partial support to H2b and reinforcing the idea that the nonsignificant bivariate result appeared due to small sample size. Furthermore, ideological
congruence also moderates the relationship between political interest and both types of
participation, but does so in the wrong direction, refuting H2c. Estimation of the final
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models proceeded through the step-by-step elimination of non-significant predictors, with
the exception of my key variables and necessary demographic controls age, sex, and race.
Voting

Agenda
congruence
Ideological
congruence
Political
interest
Idc*Polint

b
1.139
(.441)

β
.216
(.083)

1.009
(.419)

.217
(.090)

.486
(.172)
-

Strong
central
government
Ingroup
preference
Social
networks
Education
(year)
SES
Constant
R2

β
-.191
(.079)

.016

.188
(.195)

.064
(.065)

.303
(.102)

.005

.494
(.102)

.488
.401
<.001
(.080)
(.084)

.419
<.001
(.080)

-

-

-.512
(.167)

-.184
(.063)

.002

-.854
(.115)

-.324
<.001
(.068)

-

-

-

-

-

.064
(.019)

.256
0.001
(.072)

-.213
(.098)

.030

-.201
(.055)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.329
(.113)

.365
(.109)

-

-

-

.296
(.143)
.289
(.104)
-.025
(.118)
-.058
(.137)

.175
(.087)
.206
(.076)
-.015
(.069)

-.102
(.029)
.130
(.046)
.033
(.054)
-.010
(.086)
.012
(.078)

-.297
<.001
(.089)
.122
.004
(.046)
.038
.098
.536
(.060)
(.051)
-.010
.021
.905
(.080)
(.070)
.065
.876
(.075)

27.4% (0.065)

p

Online participation

b
-.635
(.294)

Ideological
intensity
Trust in non- -.427
political inst. (.197)
Welfare

Participation

.010

.039
.007
.830
.670
<.001

p
.031
.336

-.159
<.001
(.042)

47.9% (0.073)

b
-.106
(.270)

β
-.034
(.086)

-.119
(.214)

-.043
(.077)

p
.694
.576

-

-

-

-

.151
(.044)

.308
(.082)

.001

.004

.170
(.089)

.200
(.100)

.046

-

-

-

-

<.001

.117
(.061)
.021
(.069)

45.5% (0.061)

.054
.762
.387
<.001

Table 20. Multivariate regression predicting all three forms of participation.

The core hypotheses don’t fare too well in these models. Agenda congruence has a
negative main effect on traditional, and none on online participation. Thus, despite a
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somewhat surprising significant positive main effect on voting, I reject Hypothesis 1b.
H1c, on the other hand, receives no support since the interaction between agenda
congruence and political interest proved non-significant in all models (and was, in fact,
excluded based on the nulls presented in the previous table).
Hypothesis 2b’s case is similar to that of H1b: although ideological congruence has
a positive main effect on voting, it does not on the other two dependent variables,
resulting in rejection with minimal support. H2c is also rejected due to negative
interaction in two models and none in the third. Moreover, education, shows no direct or
mediated effect on any of the DVs. This goes against H3b and H3d and H3e (H3c could
not be tested due to lack of political knowledge) and on face value supports H3a.
However, once again, I would not put much stock in these results because the only
variable available to measure education was year in college. And last but not least, H4a
and H4b are disconfirmed due to no direct or mediated effect achieved by socioeconomic status.
In addition, Table 20 also contains some interesting results not mentioned in
hypotheses. First, we may observe the positive direct effect of ideological intensity on
online participation, as well as that of politicized networks on both voting and
participation. Second, it appears that those who have less trust in non-political institutions
are more likely to vote and engage in traditional means of politics, controlling for all
other variables in the model. Third, some ideology factors stood the test of step-by-step
elimination and remained in the final models. Those for a state-run welfare system
participate more online and so do those who support a strong central government (the
latter also being more likely to participate in traditional forms). We could almost call
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these participants ‘liberals’… until we observe that several factors are in fact missing,
and that ingroup preference works in the opposite direction: those who demonstrate
higher values are less likely to participate in traditional forms. And finally, gender
emerged as a significant control for online participation (β = -.138, SE=.073, p=.050),
indicating somewhat less participation in these forms among women.

3. MTurk
In order to validate the results reported in the previous two sections, I reached out to
a wider population to acquire a more representative sample. This effort was made
possible by the Senning Scholarship granted me by the Department of Political Science at
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. With their support I was able to obtain a reasonably
large sample (N = 402) using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The survey I had my new
participants fill out was nearly analogous to that used in the previous sections with three
differences. First, I added four political knowledge items, attempting to capitalize on their
independent predictive power observed in the Minnesota Twins Political dataset, as well
as to empirically test Hypothesis 3c. Second, I added items to the three batteries tapping
voting, socio-economic status, evaluation of politics. Third, I manipulated some survey
mechanics to maximize participant attention and thus the quality of the results obtained.
The first attention question on the second page was left in as a warning: if participants got
it wrong they were merely gently asked to pay more attention. In later stages, however, I
included another attention item and a timer, both on the page containing 25 ideology
items. If respondents spent 12 seconds or less on this page or got the attention question
wrong, they were redirected to the survey’s end without pay. Of the 487 participants who
started taking the survey, 85 either dropped out on their own volition or got caught by
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these items. Each participant received 2$ as remuneration through MTurk’s platform,
upon successful completion. All MTurk workers filling out the survey were required to
have at least 100 previous hits approved with a 90% approval rate or above. They also
had to be located in the United States (IP address verified).
The resulting sample’s age ranges between 18-69 years (by default MTurk workers
have to be legal adults), with a mean of 35.18 (SD=10.23), skewed toward younger age
groups (56.1% 34 or younger). All respondents are either native English speakers or
reported native-level knowledge of the language. The gender and racial distribution of the
sample is acceptable, although not fully representative of the general population with
54.7% males and 82.8% Whites (6.2% Black, 3.7% Latino, 6.7% Asian). The least
representative characteristic of the sample is education: 54.1% of participants have at
least a Bachelor’s degree while 7.7% hold a Master’s, both numbers being above their
U.S.-wide counterparts. A common criticism held against MTurk samples is that they are
liberally skewed. A brief look at their 7-point Conservative-Liberal self-placement
confirms this suspicion in the case of the one at hand: 19.7% place themselves in the
middle of the scale whereas 54.7% fall on the liberal and only 25.6% on the conservative
side. Thus, the sample is not fully representative of the U.S. general population, but
substantially more so than the previous two especially regarding participants’ age,
education, and race.
3. 1. Variables
In order to obtain a better measure of voting, I broke up the first, general voting
frequency item into three segments, asking participants if they voted in all, most, some,
one, or none of all the Presidential (1); Senate and House (2); and local (3) elections since

108

they were old enough. As a result, the overall participation model now contained three
factors: voting, as well as two kinds of participation, traditional and online. The final
model has acceptable fit with RMSEA=.063 (.057-.069, 0% chance) and CFI=.897.
Participation correlates with voting at r=.329; online participation with voting at r=.277;
and the two forms of participation with each other at r=.654 – somewhat lower compared
to previous results but still reasonably high. The three factors’ skewness is also in sync
with previous findings, being positive for the two participation forms (2.525 for
traditional and 1.547 for online), indicating generally low levels in the sample. Voting, on
the other hand, has a moderate negative skew at -.433, showing that the average
participant reported higher than average voting behavior.
The measure of agenda congruence was computed in the same fashion as before.
The resulting variable’s skewness is .125, indicating slightly less than average
incongruence for average respondents. Regarding the ideology model, I extracted the
same six factors as above, namely: Intergroup relations, Treatment of rulebreakers,
Welfare, Traditional values (in politics), Strong central government, and ‘Big Brother’
(government’s monitoring ability). The model had acceptable fit with RMSEA=.066
(CI95: .062-.069), CFI=.842. The second-order factor is a viable indicator of general
ideology as evidenced by its loadings, which vary between .632 and .900 with one
exception (BB’s standardized loading only reached .408). The ideological congruence
measure I computed using the usual procedures on these factors scores has the by now
common moderate positive skew (.682).
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As before, I also included the self-reported ideological congruence measure, along
with the open-ended question immediately following it. Below is a short selection of the
responses, unedited and broken down by answer category.
1= Very well, I have no difficulty placing myself along the scale and it accurately
represents my views.


Because I'm super liberal



I consider myself liberal on almost all dimensions (social, economic, etc.)
so this accurately represents my views.



It’s commonly used

2= Reasonably well.


Although I'm a bit more conservative economically, I tend to fit within the
"liberal" label.



Labels are good in this sense but one size fits all classifications often are
not accurate. Many liberals may be opposed to something that other liberals
approve of.

3= Not too well.


I hold opinions that fit into both 'teams'. Don't feel we should even have
them.



Because I don't recognize them as the the extremes. They don't represent
polar opposites, and they don't represent myself.



There are a lot of positions on the liberal/conservative spectrum that are
inconsistent with each other. For example with drug policy conservatives
want to keep federal laws on the books instead of letting states make their
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own laws which would be more cosistent with what they are supposed to
believe. So while I have an ideological consistency I don't believe that either
party or "liberal/conservative" spectrum reflects that.


I share opinions with both sides. For example, I support legalizing gay
marriage completely (liberal) and I also support the second amendment
(conservative). There are slightly more things I have in common with
conservatives, so I suppose I lean that way verall.. but if you asked me about
each issue specifically I would be all over the place.



I think about each issue individually based on its merits, not based on a label
of conservation or liberal.

4= Not at all, the way I think about politics is entirely different.


I have a lot of views many people would see as extreme left or extreme
right, so I can't really classify my views in one term.



Frankly, I think one ideology has become as demonstrably useless as the
other and we are in desperate need of a more moderate viewpoint capable
of understanding that there are valid viewpoints on both sides of the aisle
that need not continually devolve ito paralyzing polarization.



I think the labels liberal and conservative have been reduced into meaningless
words. They are a means to pigeonhole and marginalize people.



Im not entirely sure where I stand politically.

Regarding other relevant variables, I started by computing the usual set of factor
scores to represent a number of politically relevant constructs, namely: Political interest,
Social networks (how politicized), Political efficacy (including the empirically very
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closely related concept of civic duty), Information gathering frequency (traditional and
online sources forming a separate factor each), and Trust in partisan as well as nonpartisan political institutions. I also used confirmatory factor analysis on the four political
knowledge variables included in the survey following their recoding to correct/incorrect
dummy-variables in order to obtain a Political knowledge variable. Two additional nonpolitical factors were extracted: Socio-economic status and Religiosity. Finally, sex,
education, age, and race (converted into dummies using the majority White as the
reference group) were also available to serve as controls in the final path models.
3. 2. Results

Agenda
congruence
Ideological
congruence

Voting

Participation

Online
participation

-.034

-0.158**

-0.109**

.012

.207**

.053

Table 21. Linear relationship between agenda congruence, ideological congruence, and
participation. * denotes a correlation significant at a .05, and ** at a .01 level.

The first row of Table 21 confirms the result found in previous sections: agenda
congruence appears, once again, to be negatively correlated with participation (both
online and traditional) and not at all with voting; resulting in the rejection of H1a. The
findings regarding ideological congruence are, however, different. This time my second
key IV is uncorrelated with voting and online participation, but boasts a significant
positive linear relationship with traditional participation. This result lends conditional
support to H2a.
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Voting

Agenda
congruence
Political
interest
Agc*Polint
Constant Model1
R2 - Model 1
Ideological
congruence
Political
interest
Idc*Polint
Constant Model 2
R2 - Model 2

Participation

Online participation

b

β

p

b

β

p

b

β

p

-.039
(.168)

-.011
(.046)

.819

-.465
(.150)

-.129
(.041)

.002

-.309
(.156)

-.086
(.044)

.048

.495
(.041)
-.172
(.151)
-.001
(.043)

.485
.358
<.001
(.038)
(.045)
-.045
-.351
.257
(.040)
(.149)
-.003
.976
(.044)

23.9% (.036)
-.024
(.109)
.502
(.041)
.125
(.095)
-.001
(.043)

<.001

16.3% (.035)

-.010
.431
.823
(.045)
(.092)
.492
.369
<.001
(.038)
(.048)
.054
.187
.188
(.041)
(.105)
-.002
.980
(.043)

23.9% (.037)

<.001

.358
.501
<.001
(.037)
(.044)
-.094
-.137
.018
(.038)
(.198)
-.001
.948
(.041)
<.001

.976

26.7% (.035)

.181
.100
<.001
(.035)
(.100)
.369
.503
<.001
(.039)
(.045)
.083
-.006
.076
(.045)
(.126)

17.9% (.036)

.503
<.001
(.038)
-.037
.488
(.053)

.042
.317
(.042)
.505
<.001
(.039)
-.003
.961
(.056)

.969 0 (.041)
<.001

<.001

25.9% (.038)

.998
<.001

Table
22. Multivariate regression predicting participation from agenda congruence, political interest, and
their interaction (Model 1), as well as ideological congruence, political interest, and their
interaction (Model 2).

The ideological congruence measure has a conditional positive effect on traditional
participation (holding political interest constant at its mean). This result, however, does
not hold for the other two dependent variables, indicating partial support for Hypothesis
2b. Hypothesis 2c is completely rejected due to no significant corresponding interaction
effects, meaning that ideological congruence does not moderate the relationship between
political interest and participation in this sample. Moreover, agenda congruence’s
predictive ‘behavior’ is similar to that observed in previous models with a negative
conditional effect on traditional and online participation (the latter being weaker at
p=.048) and none on voting, resulting in the rejection of H1b. Agenda congruence does,
however, appear to moderate the relationship between political interest and traditional
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participation… but (unsurprisingly) it does so in a negative direction. Coupled with the
customary null regarding the other two DVs, I conclude no support for Hypothesis 1c in
this dataset.
Voting

Agenda
congruence
Ideological
congruence
Political
interest
Idc*Polint
Ideological
intensity
Political
efficacy
Ingroup
preference
Social
networks
Education
SES
Constant
R2

b
-.078
(.161)

β
-.023
(.047)

-.215
(.144)

-.094
(.063)

.287
(.069)

Participation
p

Online participation

b
-.420
(.167)

β
-.118
(.047)

b
-.256
(.173)

β
-.076
(.052)

.520
(.119)

.223
.065
<.001
(.045)
(.118)

.029
(.053)

.298
.287
<.001
(.071)
(.045)

.291
.339
<.001
(.045)
(.053)

.362
<.001
(.053)

.628
.135

p
.012

p
.140
.583

-

-

-

.166
(.083)

.075
(.036)

.040

-

-

-

-

-

-

.045
(.018)

.135
(.050)

.010

.035
(.014)

.109
(.042)

.010

.247
(.068)

.245
<.001
(.069)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.064
(.028)

-.150
(.065)

.022

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.108
(.042)
.011
(.048)

.070
(.031)
-.028
(.042)
.159
(.053)

.028

.091
(.036)
.011
(.048)
.017
(.056)

.069
(.031)
-.024
(.036)
.162
(.059)
.061
(.062)

-.061
(.032)
.048
(.049)
.036
(.053)

-.082
(.041)
.050
(.051)

.011
.813
.756

.510
.006
.321

23.8% (.035) <.001 24.1% (.038) <.001 25.7% (.030)
Table 23. Multivariate regression predicting all three forms of participation.

.046
.327
.497
<.001

In the models presented in Table 23, agenda congruence is either a negative
(traditional participation) or a non-significant predictor (the other two dependent
variables), disconfirming Hypothesis 1b right off the bat. Hypothesis 1c is in a similar
boat because the interaction term was dropped due to non-significance. Regarding
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ideological congruence, we may observe only one significant, albeit important result:
traditional participation increases by .520 units for each unit increase in ideological
congruence, controlling for all other variables in the model at 0 (their mean in most
cases). The other two coefficients pertaining to ideological congruence are, however, not
statistically significant, resulting in weak partial support for Hypothesis 2b. H2c’s case is
very similar due to only one significant positive interaction term between ideological
congruence and political interest (once again, when predicting traditional participation),
indicating weak partial support for this hypothesis.
Regarding the results pertaining to variables other than those included in my key
hypotheses, education’s direct positive effect on voting, coupled with no effect on
traditional participation and negative impact on its online counterpart indicates weak
partial support for H3a. Improved data availability also enabled me to test all other parts
of Hypothesis 3. However, only one mediation effect proved significant: that of socioeconomic status between education and traditional participation (β = .038, SE=.015,
p=.012). All the rest were non-significant, leading to the rejection of H3b-e (with weak
partial support for H3e). SES’s direct impact is only present in the model with traditional
participation as the DV, meaning weak partial confirmation for H4a. Hypothesis 4b, on
the other hand, is completely rejected due to lack of mediation by political interest
between SES and participation. Controls not presented in the table above include gender
(non-significant throughout) and age (significant in two models, for voting β = .204,
SE=.042, p<.001; and online participation β = =-.115, SE=.037, p=.001). In addition, race
was also added to all models in the form of dummy variables, using the most frequent
White as the comparison group. These variables produced a significant effect in three
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cases only: Asians appear less likely to vote and participate online than Whites; while
Hispanics are less likely to participate in traditional forms. Other interesting results
include the positive effect of ideological intensity on both traditional and online
participation, that of politicized social networks on traditional participation, and that of
political efficacy only on voting. And finally, those who favor their own ingroup over
outgroups more strongly are less likely to vote, at least in this sample.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter consists of three sections. The first I will dedicate to the summary of
the results reported above, starting with an overview and discussion of all hypotheses
tested, and followed by a detailed presentation of the hypotheses involving ideological
congruence. The second section is centered on two related topics: my dissertation’s
limitations, and my recommendations along with directions for future research. I will
conclude by briefly reviewing the potential ramifications of the results found – especially
regarding representation – in an attempt to answer the ‘so what’ question.
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1. Summary and Discussion of Hypothesis Testing
H

Variable(s)

Prediction

Testing outcome

1a

Agenda congruence

positive r

Reject

1b

Agenda congruence

positive β

Reject

1c

Agenda congruence * Political
interest

positive β

Reject

2a

Ideological congruence

positive r

retain for participation,
reject for voting

2b

Ideological congruence

positive β

retain for participation,
reject for voting

2c

Ideological congruence *
Political interest

positive β

Reject

3a

Education

non-significant β

Reject

3b

Education --> Political interest

positive β

retain (partial support)

3c

Education --> Political
knowledge

positive β

retain (partial support)

3d

Education --> Social networks

positive β

retain (partial support)

3e

Education --> SES

positive β

retain (partial support)

4a

Socio-economic status

positive β

retain (partial support)

4b

SES --> Political interest

positive β

Reject

Table 24. Hypothesis testing summary.

For purposes of the following explanation I will rely on simple acronyms to
reference the datasets presented in corresponding sections of this dissertation. Most of
these simply follow the original names, while ‘Ps1’ and ‘Ps2’ stand for the two rounds
using the Political Science Experimental Participant Pool (PSEPP), and ‘Twin’ for the
Minnesota Twins Political Survey. Not all datasets were created equal, however, as WVS
for example represents five models while Twin, Ps1, Ps2 and MTurk only one; a fact that
has to and will be accounted for during the final decision regarding my hypotheses.
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H1a: Positive linear relationship between agenda congruence and political
participation. The testing of this as well as other hypotheses involving agenda
congruence was only possible in four datasets, my own three and Twin, findings derived
from the latter being of dubious relevance due to the questionable validity of the measure
they were based on. In the case of the particular hypothesis, however, this made no
difference as I found no support for it (the relationship being either negative or null) in
any of the models, resulting in its clear rejection.
H1b: Agenda congruence has a significant positive conditional/main effect in
multivariate models predicting political participation. After H1a it is not surprising that
this hypothesis received no support at all (with the exception of voting in the Ps2
sample), prompting its complete rejection.
H1c: Agenda congruence moderates the relationship between political interest and
participation in multivariate models (positive β). Similarly, this hypothesis also received
no support in the four datasets where its testing was possible. In some, agenda
congruence did moderate the relationship, but with a negative sign (e.g. Twin voting, Ps1
participation and online). Thus, I reject it along with the other two.
The rejection of H1a-c raises the question: did I find no corroboration due to faulty
theory or bad measurement? And can we draw this conclusion based on the results
presented? Starting with theory, there are at least two ways agenda congruence may exert
an influence on participation. The first may be termed ‘debilitating agenda
incongruence’: if one notices that the ruling elite focuses on, from their perspective, ‘the
wrong’ issues, one may decide not to participate. After all, agenda is a form of
representation. If I feel like most politicians deal with topics I do not find important, my
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incentive to participate is diminished. This is the avenue I built my reasoning around in
chapter one.
However, there is another way through what we may call ‘facilitating agenda
incongruence’, which can work in the exact opposite direction. The mindset behind it can
be summarized as: since the current elite does not represent my agenda, let’s contribute to
put someone in office that does. For individuals who accept this line of reasoning and
perceive it as a realistic possibility, incongruence may lead to higher, rather than lower,
participation. It may have been the case, for example, in the most recent Presidential
election where a lot of people felt that Donald Trump (and even Bernie Sanders) was
addressing issues the rest of the elite was not.
Lastly, it is possible that the difference between which avenue affects whom is not
incidental, but dependent on another variable. My proposed candidate is political interest.
To advance this argument, let us first consider the samples where testing of these
hypotheses was possible. Above (p. 57-58.) I already noted that Twin results are
unreliable for a number of reasons. This leaves Ps1, Ps2 and MTurk. The key question is:
was the level of political interest observed in these samples representative of that in the
general population? The logical reference point is the U.S. section of the largest N
representative sample, WVS. In this sample, 57.3% of participants selected the
‘somewhat interested’ or ‘very interested’ answer options out of the four associated with
the political interest item. The skewness of the political interest factor (-0.23) suggests
similar, moderately above average levels. In this light the corresponding numbers from
the sets presented in chapter four are very telling: 87.3% and -.50 in Ps1, 86.3% and -.33
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in Ps2 and 86.3% and -.18 in MTurk, respectively.30 Thus, we can conclude that the
interest level in these three datasets is generally much higher than in the general
population. But what does it mean for agenda congruence?
For those low in political interest, agenda incongruence may have no effect on
participation. If an individual is alienated from politics or completely uninterested in it,
they will not be likely to go to a rally or participate in a campaign just because their
agenda congruence increases somewhat. For those with moderate, and especially high
levels of political interest, the effect may be different. If interest is coupled with feeling
like their agenda is not represented, it is possible that they will be prone to facilitating
incongruence. And if a candidate comes along who finally offers them the chance to be
represented, it is logical that they will be more likely participate in support of that
candidate. Thus, it is possible that the facilitating effect of agenda incongruence was
simply stronger in the samples I used due to high general levels of political interest.
Being a firm believer in the importance of negative results, I would be happy to content
myself with having shown where not to look. In this case, however, the negative result
potentially reveals an even more interesting pattern, although one that has to be
thoroughly tested before being accepted as something other than an artifact.
H2a: Positive linear relationship between ideological congruence and political
participation.
H2b: Ideological congruence has a significant positive conditional/main effect in
multivariate models predicting political participation.

30

This also shows that computing factor scores using multiple items helped obtain closer to normal variables
than the original single items.
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H2c: Ideological congruence moderates the relationship between political interest
and participation in multivariate models (positive β).
These three are the most important hypotheses of my entire dissertation given that
they were tested in every dataset and represent my main contribution to existing
scholarship. I will present and discuss them in a separate table below so as to provide
more information and a better chance for a sophisticated evaluation and informed
judgment. For now, let me just state my final decision, which is to retain H2a and H2b
for participation, while simultaneously rejecting these two for the other DVs, and H2c
altogether.
H3a: Education has NO significant positive direct main effect in multivariate
models predicting political participation. The hypothesized null result was rather bold
considering the well-established and oft-replicated relationship between education and
participation outlined in chapter one. My reasoning relied on the theoretical possibility
that education only acts through other variables (represented by mediation effects) with
no variance left over to be explained by its direct effect once all these have been taken
into account. It did receive some support as I found this to be the case when predicting
participation in the Ps1, Ps2 and MTurk datasets, as well as online participation in
another two. In all the other sets, however, I found a significant positive conditional
effect. Thus, the only possible decision is to reject H3a and conclude that education does
have a direct positive main effect on participation when accounting for mediation effects.
I maintain, however, that there are valid reasons not to retract my original reasoning
presented in chapter one and accept this result without question. To being with, recall the
original formulation, which entailed that the null hypothesized in H3a should only stand
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where I can measure all the indirect paths since inability to do so opens the door for an
indirect relationship ‘masquerading’ as a direct one. This was only the case in my own
datasets, where the hypothesis was corroborated, although the inherent weakness of this
variable (especially in Ps1 and Ps2, consisting entirely of college students) prevents farreaching conclusions. Nevertheless, the fact that H3a was supported in these sets despite
little variance may be taken as an encouraging sign. If it worked in these conditions, full
mediation may be more likely to work in more representative datasets, provided that all
mediation effects are accounted for. At the very least, we cannot rule out this possibility
until it is properly tested and replicated.
The effect of education on political participation is mediated by political interest
(H3b), political knowledge (H3c), social networks (H3d) and socioeconomic status (H3e)
in multivariate models. H3b received support in nine models: ANES voting and
participation, Twin voting, as well as in six out of ten WVS models. At the same time, it
was rejected in the other four WVS models, Twin participation, and all of my own
datasets. However, considering the relative validity of the measure used in these sets and
the comparatively low predictive power of the four WVS models where the hypothesis
was rejected (signaling potential problems with the DV and/or other relationships), I will
retain H3b with partial support. Hypothesis 3c is hard to call due to the absence of
political knowledge in most models. In MTurk it received no support at all – a finding
perhaps related to no direct impact of political knowledge, which may be connected to
the significantly higher than average knowledge level of Turkers, as indicated by the
skewness of -1.108 on the factor score and 58% of participants’ correct answers to all
four questions. Furthermore, the null result is in stark contrast with the full support this
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hypothesis garnered in the Twin dataset. Considering these factors, I decided to retain it,
albeit conditionally. H3d’s situation is similar: not tested in most, retained in the Twin
dataset but no support in Murk, Ps1 and Ps2. If we take the latter two out of the equation
for the reasons outlined above, we are in the same situation as with the previous
hypothesis, which prompts the same decision, conditional retention. The case with H3e
is also mixed as a result of full support in ANES and Twin, partial in WVS (seven
models) and MTurk (only participation), and none in MTurk voting and online, as well as
Twin, Ps1 and Ps2. Because the datasets where it is supported have better general
characteristics, my decision is to conditionally retain H3e.
H4a: Socio-economic status has a significant positive direct main effect in
multivariate models predicting political participation. The findings related to this
hypothesis are rather mixed with full support in ANES and Twin, partial support in WVS
(six models), and MTurk (only participation), and none at all in Ps1 and Ps2. Due to the
representativeness and sheer number of those in the first category, my verdict is to retain
it.
H4b: The effect of socio-economic status on political participation is mediated by
political interest. This hypothesis received full support in the Twin dataset but no support
at all in any of the others where its testing was possible. Hence the only possible
decision: reject.
Recognizing the importance of H2a-c, I will continue with a second summary table
whose main purpose is to provide a sophisticated overview of the corresponding results,
while also highlighting some key characteristics of each sample in order to aid
interpretation and support the final decision regarding these hypotheses.
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Dataset

DV

Idc r

Final
Idc *
Idc β
model N
Polint
R2

.044
.010
.024
40.3%
Voting (p=.116)
(p=.657) (p=.305)

ANES

1315

Part

DPT - U.S.

.068
.040
.029
42.1%
(p=.015) (p=.083) (p=.239)

Sample
Representative for
age, education,
gender, race, U.S.
region.

-.203
-.099
.061
15.1%
Voting (p<.001)
(p=.055) (p=.214)
361

Part

-.164
.010
-.014
44.8%
(p=.004) (p=.828) (p=.727)

Representative only
.196
.159
.099
for gender (mostly
4%
Voting (p=.026)
(p=.098) (p=.422)
white college
161
DPT - H.U.
students in intro level
.155
.004
-.016
50.6%
Part (p=.062)
political science
(p=.959) (p=.774)
courses).
-.023
.074
-.115
.9%
Voting (p=.791)
(p=.058) (p=.077)
168
DPT - D.K.
.016
-.101
.017
Part (p=.843) (p=267) (p=.911) 36.3%
Representative
enough for
1349 education. Otherwise
.072
.054
white, mostly males
.127
(p=.007), (p=.021), 35.8%
between 55-63.
(p<.001)
7th
11th

.025
.024
.032
19%
Voting (p=.547)
(p=.385) (p=.393)

Twins
Part

.059

WVS Germany

.171
-.050
(p=.018),
23.6%
Voting (p<.001)
(p=.061)
8th

Part

.052
.273
.026
(p=.046),
31.3%
(p<.001)
(p=.252)
11th

2046

Representative for
age, education,
.057
gender, region, and
.091
-.034
(p=.035),
21.9%
Voting (p<.001)
race
where applicable
(p=.075)
7th
(no
data on race in
2443
WVS - Japan
.101
Japan and Slovenia,
.219
.027
Part (p<.001)
(p<.001),
14.8%
very
little variance in
(p=.150)
4th
Germany).
WVS Slovenia

-.030
.015
.027
Voting (p=.320)
14.7%
(p=.629) (p=.367)
1068

Part

.221
.027
-.021
24.5%
(p<.001) (p=.354) (p=.435)
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.058

WVS South Africa

-.038
-.004
(p=.001), 20.9%
Voting (p=.034)
(p=.814)
8th

Part

.134
-.032
.136
(p<.001), (p=.033), 26.8%
(p<.001)
3rd
13th

3531

.234
-.009
-.016
Voting (p<.001)
35.5%
(p=.721) (p=.453)

WVS - U. S.
Part

.059
.173
.017
(p=.014),
32.6%
(p<.001)
(p=.394)
10th

2332

.003
-.003
-.006
Voting (p=.965)
12.7%
(p=.963) (p=.941)

PSEPP 1

Representative only
for gender (mostly
white college
-.182
-.061
.055
Part (p=.023)
45.7% 181
(p=.250) (p=.313)
students in intro level
political science
-.187
-.167
-.002
courses at UNL).
Online (p=.020)
51.9%
(p=.015) (p=.975)
.217

.111
-.030
(p=.016),
27.4%
Voting (p=.191)
(p=.672)
nd
2

PSEPP 2

Part

Representative only
for gender (mostly
white college
-.042
.064
-.184
47.9% 140
(p=.312) (p=.336) (p=.002)
students in intro level
political science
courses
at UNL).
-.186
-.043
-.324

Online (p=.027) (p=.576) (p<.001) 45.5%
.012
-.094
.021
23.8%
Voting (p=.816)
(p=.135) (p=.353)

MTurk

Part

.223
.075
.207
(p<.001), (p=.040), 24.1%
(p<.001)
2nd
6th

.053
.029
-.005
25.7%
Online (p=.290)
(p=.583) (p=.943)

402

Representative for
gender, reasonably
close for age and
race. Very liberalleaning.

Table 25. Summary of the relationship between ideological congruence and participation in each
sample, as well as key sample characteristics. The ranks following β weights indicate the particular
variable’s ranking in the ‘pecking order’ of significant predictors.

The positive bivariate linear relationship between traditional means of participation
and ideological congruence appears reasonably well-established with confirmation in
ANES, all WVS models, as well as Twin and MTurk. Hypothesis 2a is, however, rejected
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in the three DPT samples (with a negative coefficient in the U.S. and a positive one
approaching significance in Hungary), Ps1 and Ps2. At first glance, the multivariate
counterparts of these results appear rather mixed: the positive relationship remained
significant in Twin (7th strongest predictor), WVS Germany (11th), WVS Japan (4th),
WVS U.S. (10th), WVS South Africa (3rd) and MTurk (2nd); but non-significant in an
almost equal number of datasets: ANES (despite a favorable bivariate relationship,
although it does approach significance here as well), all three DPT sets, WVS Slovenia,
Ps1 and Ps2.
Upon closer investigation, these results reveal a curious pattern: the relationship
seems to hold in all but one of the representative datasets, and does not in the nonrepresentative ones. Furthermore, as noted in chapter three, while ANES contained a
good participation battery, the ideology coverage provided by the items available was
suboptimal. DPT’s situation was the opposite: here very good ideological coverage was
paired with a weak participation battery (limited to four binary items). Ps1 and Ps2
represent special cases in a number of ways. Most notably, they consisted of young and
predominantly white, Midwestern college students. Moreover, as I showed on page 111,
their level of political interest proved significantly higher than that of the general
population. And lastly, their traditional participation was significantly lower as noted in
chapter three, most likely due to their age (but perhaps also their position in life). These
characteristics call into question the validity of the results derived from the datasets
affected, which in turn serves to corroborate the support for Hypothesis 2b confirmed in
the case of traditional participation.
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Regarding the moderating effect of ideological congruence on the relationship
between political interest and traditional participation (H2c), the conclusion is different.
This hypothesis is retained only in two models, Twin (11th in the ranking of all
predictors) and MTurk (6th). In the rest of the thirteen models run, it was rejected due to a
null finding or significant negative relationship (Ps2 and WVS South Africa). Under this
weight of empirical evidence, the only logical conclusion is to reject H2c and accept that,
overall, ideological congruence does not moderate the relationship between traditional
participation and its strongest predictor (political interest).31
In the case of voting, the results are clear mostly due to this dependent variable’s
positive bivariate (linear) relationship with ideological congruence present in only four
models: DPT in Hungary and WVS in Germany, Japan, and in the U.S. In the other nine
datasets, the null prevailed. Furthermore, only two of the four relationships mentioned
above remained significant in multivariate models with all the controls included: WVS
Germany (the 8th strongest predictor) and Japan (7th).32 The picture is even clearer with
respect to the hypothesized moderation effect as it is confirmed in only one dataset (WVS
South Africa). In sum, ideological congruence does not play a role in predicting voting,
nor does it moderate the effect of political interest on this key form of participation.
Online participation paints a similarly uncomplicated picture. The corresponding
hypotheses were only testable in the three datasets specifically designed for this project.
However, it fell through in each of those, with no significant bivariate, multivariate, or

31

This conclusion remains the same after accounting for the above described interest effects.
Although for fairness’s sake I have to mention that an additional model ‘caught up’, Ps2 (2 nd strongest
predictor). This result is, however, more than questionable in light of the non-significant corresponding
bivariate relationship and the sample’s limitations detailed above.
32
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moderating effect in most; coupled with a negative main in Ps1, and a negative moderator
effect in Ps1 and Ps2. Taking into account these results it is reasonably safe to conclude
that there is no relationship between online participation and ideological congruence.
A potential Achilles’ heel of most social scientific investigations is determining the
direction of causality. My results and design – lacking the possibility to establish
temporal precedence and guarantee the absence of alternative causal explanations – do
not allow for direct causal argumentation. It is entirely possible that instead of ideological
congruence leading to more frequent (traditional) participatory behavior, those who
participate less retroactively report less congruence in order to rationalize their actions.
This possibility is particularly realistic with respect to self-reported congruence measures.
I do believe, however, that the construction of my factor-based ideological congruence
measure alleviates most of these concerns. It is, after all, entirely based on ideology items
(seemingly unrelated to congruence) where participants are most likely not in the position
to guess how those items will be used to tap a different construct, congruence.
And finally (but still connected to the issue of causality), I have not yet accounted
for the fact that feeling misrepresented may work in a direction opposite to what I
theorized and similarly to the argument outlined for agenda congruence on page 111.
While I maintain that it makes sense to assume that those who do not feel represented by
the political system and its various agents choose to participate less in said system, we
cannot rule out the possibility that it may have the exact opposite effect on some people.
One purpose of political participation is, after all, to change things. If I don’t feel
represented by current politicians, one thing I can do is work to put someone else in
office. If viable, I would expect this line of reasoning to apply more to voting, at least in
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certain pluralist polities (where the ‘lesser of two evils’ approach applies more), partially
depending on the realistic outcomes. After all, in 2016 Americans did elect arguably the
least ideological candidate in recent history. If we found a way to control for this
difference in intention, we may be able to gain a better insight into the mechanics of
participation and thus a chance to better understand this behavior of key importance.

2. General Limitations and Directions for Future Research
My first recommendation to scholars studying political participation is to measure
this construct with scales, not binary items. About ten of these variables – if selected
appropriately – appear rather easily convertible to a single, well-behaved participation
factor, which appears to provide significantly better coverage of the underlying behaviors
and thus more believable and higher quality results. I find the same argument – further
corroborated by the R2 of models where this approach was possible – valid in the case of
voting: four scaled (1-4 or 1-5) variables seem superior to one binary item.
Furthermore, I advise students of politics pay attention to non-institutional
components of participation and include some in your surveys and models. At first, my
intention was to treat variables pertaining to these forms as part of a related but
conceptually different factor. Empirical reality, however, invalidated this approach: the
institutional and non-institutional factors were too closely correlated in most models
(with an r above .91 in Ps1, Ps2, and MTurk). However, this does not necessarily indicate
no potential, especially if we recall the sample characteristics of these datasets. In the
only representative sample where I tested it – ANES – the correlation between
institutional and non-institutional forms of participation was .823; strong but not a
convincing indicator of too close relatedness. Another relevant clue is the negative
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relationship between trust in non-political institutions and participation reported in
section two of chapter three. For example, it does not seem too far-fetched to hypothesize
that those with high interest and low ideological congruence (or other factors contributing
to their relative disappointment in the political establishment) may be more likely to turn
to non-institutional forms if they feel that these provide a viable alternative. The strongest
specific variable candidates I would consider based on the results presented in this
dissertation are: [How often have you …. in the past 12 months] “donated a significant
amount of your time and/or money to a grassroots organization (not aligned with an
existing party”, “attended a demonstration or protest”, and “signed a political/social
petition”. At the very least, these may help gain broader coverage of participation or aid
the quest for uncovering different relationships and underlying predictive structures.
Furthermore, I also recommend adding a few online participation variables. My
core hypotheses are not supported work in corresponding models, but their R2s are
nevertheless encouraging. In these models, online participation items seem to tap an
aspect of participation related but not analogous with the above two forms commonly
used as dependent variables. Furthermore, they show interesting differences with regards
to their predictors and mediation relationships; not to mention the likely increase in
importance of these forms as the virtual environment continues to gain more and more
ground in politics.
One final fact related to participation that has to be accounted for is that the
proportion of variance explained appears to be generally lower in the case of voting
compared with other forms of participation. A closer look reveals that the most likely
reasons for this were measurement and sample. The former’s faulty nature in Ps1 and Ps2
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I discussed in the corresponding sections. In addition, these as well as the other two with
a very low R2 (DPT Hungary and Denmark) were college student samples, three collected
at UNL. In representative datasets there does not appear to be a significant difference
between the predictive power of voting models compared with the rest.
Regarding political interest, my recommendation is simple: always make sure to
have a good battery (at least about 4-5 items including a direct measure in addition to
subjective evaluation of and feeling toward politics) available and use the resulting factor
scores to test mediation effects. This approach has the potential to reveal findings that
would otherwise remain hidden from view as several variables seem to act through
political interest, occasionally even when in themselves they boast no direct impact on
participation.
Scientific fairness compels me to suggest not including agenda, or at least not
doing so the exact same way I did. Nevertheless, the analysis of my results reveals
potentially very interesting avenues for future research. For example, my congruence
measure ignored the fact that absolute values cannot reflect: the difference between
attributing more or less personal importance to certain issues compared to that perceived
by the political elite. This difference may play a role in predicting participation or other
political behaviors. Furthermore, we may arrive at intriguing conclusions through
tracking the stability of personal agenda through longitudinal studies; or by observing
how personal agenda shrinks or expands based on external circumstances with possible
consequences regarding congruence (Imagine, for example, what the corresponding
results would have looked like during or after the Great Depression, 9/11, or the Second
World War with a lot of attention focused on a small set of issues). Still related to agenda
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in itself, is it possible that there are groups who think in a 1-factor framework while
others consistently consider a certain group of political issues important and others not so
much? And perhaps more interestingly, do people with different ideological leanings
and/or partisan identities have different agendas?
My suggestions with respect to ideological congruence follow a different course of
reasoning. Ideology’s key role in politically relevant investigations results in its very
frequent measurement. I believe that the arguments I put forward in chapter one, further
substantiated by the results reported in chapters three and four, lend adequate support to
my recommendation to use the 42-item battery reported here to measure this latent
variable, as opposed to shorter alternatives (especially simple self-placement). As a
related remark (first encountered as a comment by my participants) I suggest considering
the inclusion of an additional, ‘not sure’ answer option for each ideology item. This may
help ensure that middle responses reflect real middle-of-the-road (and not simply
uncertain) attitudes, potentially increasing the validity and power of this measure. This
sidenote aside, a six-factor structure seems to capture ideology much better than any
other, in my opinion warranting the extra space necessary to successfully implement this
approach. Once all the items are available, constructing an ideological congruence
measure the way I outlined in chapter two is a reasonably simple process. We have seen
how this variable plays an independent role in predicting traditional participation. Thus, I
see no reason not to include ideological congruence in models predicting participation,
especially since it is my hope that future scholarship will measure ideology with scales
capable of picking up on this construct’s complexity. For traditional forms of
participation, it is a predictor on its own right. For the other two forms, as of now, I can
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only say it may serve as a control, although considering all the above I cannot rule out
that replication may find different results with respect to voting and online participation
in more representative adult samples. One additional direction for future research is
tackling the other side of ideological congruence more directly. Instead of assuming the
unidimensionality of the elite’s ideology, we could tackle it directly. On the other hand, it
would be interesting to see if individuals who perceive the elite as unidimensional
participate more or less than others.
Other studied variables, such as education, socio-economic status, age, race, and
gender, will likely always be included in relevant surveys regardless of my findings. My
modest potential addition to well-established corresponding research avenues is directing
more attention to mediation. While the jury is still out on whether political interest,
knowledge, social networks and SES indeed mediate the relationship between education
and participation, I believe my results create ‘reasonable doubt’. It is debatable whether
education exerts an influence on participation only through these variables (as signaled
by the rejection of H3a), and some mediation effects reached a β considerable enough to
warrant further investigation. Moreover, it seems reasonable that individuals’ ideological
or agenda congruence with elites might increase as education increases and they are
introduced to the “popular” or “elite” ways of thinking about issues. This would fit with
the idea that people who are more politically knowledgeable tend to be more
ideologically extreme. Conversely, one could also make the argument that more
education leads people to have the ability to think about issues in a more complex,
multidimensional fashion. Based on my results, it is justified to say that these competing
hypotheses provide potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
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Among variables not included but worth considering, those pertaining to different
aspects of the political system and environment at large emerge as potentially very
important. Previous research has identified several variables in this category associated
with various forms of participation. The effect of registration on voter turnout, for
instance, has been studied rather extensively (Citrin, Green, and Morris 2014; Jackman
and Miller 1995; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978) in itself, as well as in combination
with other variables such as education (Nagler 1991). Contact from political parties has
also been established as an important (positive) predictor of voting and institutional
participation both in person (Gerber and Green 2000) and online (Aldrich et al. 2015).
Parties’ mobilizing effect is a related and potentially important line of research (Robert
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Other features of the
political environment such as regime type (determining the variety of options available)
and form of representation may also be worth taking into account. The general argument
regarding the latter is that proportional systems allow for more parties, potentially more
cleavages, and thus better representation than their majoritarian counterparts. In the
terminology of this dissertation, proportional systems may act to reduce general levels of
ideological (or agenda) incongruence. By this logic we could expect participant who
agree that a successful and viable third party would be a necessary/useful addition to the
political system of the United States to show lower levels of participation. While I was
not able to use this variable in this dissertation, its simplicity and presence in many
ANES datasets may warrant considerations regarding its inclusion. Nevertheless, whether
this phenomenon actually works in practice is, however, widely debated (Bingham
Powell 2009; Boix 1999; Clark 2006; Golder and Lloyd 2014; Golder and Stramski 2010;
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Louwerse 2012). One way to contribute to this debate is theoretically possible by using
effective party number (Dunleavy and Boucek 2003; Taagepera and Grofman 1985; or
the new version developed by Golosov 2015) as a variable in related models. The
problem with this approach is that, as we have seen, different item-to-factor relationships
and factor intercorrelations in different polities work against the possibility of direct
comparison across substantially diverse regions. Thus it is up to future research to
determine the relevance of the institutional constraints regarding the relationships
tackled.
Despite the arguably well-established nature of the relationship between personality
and political attitudes as well as behavior including participation, I did not include it in
my own investigations. The reason was mostly pragmatic: adding a reasonably good
personality battery would have pushed the number of items in my own survey beyond
acceptable. I also have theoretical qualms with the dominance the Big Five theory of
personality has achieved in recent years. Nevertheless, it seems highly likely that in some
form, personality matters for politics. The basic picture (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009;
Hibbing et al. 2014; Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013; Mondak et al. 2010; Schwartz,
Caprara, and Vecchione 2010) seems to be that ‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’ have
different moral foundations, personalities and different functioning regarding their core
values. Less extensive but still significant literature has addressed the relationship
between personality and participation directly (Bekkers 2005; Gallego and Oberski 2012;
Gerber et al. 2011; Ha, Kim, and Jo 2013; Vecchione and Caprara 2009; Weinschenk
2014). The results vary by forms of participation studied and personality aspects
accounted for. The most robust finding appears to be that Extraversion (and in some
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special cases, Emotional Stability and Openness) is positively associated with various
forms of participation (and Agreeableness with forms that involve conflict). The nature of
this relationship, however, is unclear: some maintain that it works directly (Gallego and
Oberski 2012), while others purport that it acts through attitudinal variables – such as
political interest, political discussion, or civic duty (Vecchione and Caprara 2009;
Weinschenk 2014). Based on this literature and the beta values in the corresponding
results sections, I believe that including personality would not have altered the
relationships in my hypotheses significantly. Nevertheless, it presents an intriguing
direction of future research.
The past decade – roughly since the publication of Alford, Funk, and Hibbing's
(2005) seminal article – has brought what could be called a major paradigm shift or at
least ‘paradigm addition’ to political science. One of the serendipitous consequences of
the emergence of the Biopolitics movement (although Charney (Charney and English
2012; Charney 2008) may disagree with me here in the unlikely event of ever reading my
dissertation) is that no discussion or theory section can now be complete without at least
addressing biological variables. A directly relevant subset of the literature has dealt with
connecting various biological variables with participation from establishing the
heritability of turnout (Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008) through connecting participation
to specific genes (Fowler and Dawes 2008) to integrating genetic underpinnings into the
general conceptual framework of analysis (Klemmensen et al. 2012; Verhulst 2012).
Even more to the point, scholars (French et al. 2011; Gruszczynski et al. 2012) appear to
have established a direct link between endocrinology and participation. Their research
points to a hitherto ignored characteristic of political participation: it is stressful, which
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may be differentially true for its different forms (Neiman et al. 2015; Waismel-Manor,
Ifergane, and Cohen 2011). This is a very important finding for it holds the promise of
illuminating part of the casual pathway between the variables listed above (such as
negative evaluations of the political system, for example) and participation. It is possible
that the stressfulness of politics keeps people away from some forms of participation
through these avenues. The best way to test this effect would no doubt be a direct
approach. Another potentially interesting direction for future research would be exploring
the mediation effect of ideological congruence on the relationship between stress
(measured by baseline cortisol, for example) to predict participation.
And finally, it would be interesting to observe these effects over time. If a party or
candidate represents and alternative agenda and/or group of issues, they may bring in a
lot of this ‘silent minority’, as some say happened in 2016. As agenda and ideological
representation changes in the elite, their relationship with participation may follow suit.

3. Concluding Remarks
So what exactly have we learned? That if we ignore ideological congruence – as
well as some interesting moderation and mediation effects – while studying political
participation (although not necessarily its online form or voting), we risk missing
important elements of the overall picture. Note that, even with the drop observed in
models run using more representative data, the final R2 values presented in Table 25
exceed the 31% reported by Plutzer (2002) and by far those mentioned by Matsusaka and
Palda (1999), whose models’ predictive power for turnout does not exceed .207 even
after the addition of past turnout.
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But why is this important, going beyond the potential theoretical value that has to
be verified by the long and unpredictable process of replication and convergence, at the
end of which we may still be left with results only interesting to a small group of political
scientist? My answer harks back to the same argument I used in chapter one with the
important difference that it is now supported by empirical evidence. It seems my results
provide strong enough evidence for stating that the discrepancy between the
dimensionality of the elite’s and the public’s ideology (although not agenda) does have a
negative effect on political participation. Participation is the cornerstone of the process of
democratic representation. If it is unequal (based on SES or issue ownership, see Egan
2013; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2013), that poses serious questions regarding the
functioning of the polity.
This underscores the importance of disseminating this information (especially if
corroborated by future studies) due to social science’s role in informing the public. The
significance of this role should not be underestimated, empirically based results being the
only thing standing in the way of public discourse based on mere speculation. In other
words, if the current setup of political ideology has a detrimental impact on participation
and thus representation, members of the electorate deserve to and need to know about it!
Where they may take this knowledge is outside the scope of this dissertation. One
possible avenue is using it as an argument for political reform such as transition toward a
different system of representation or an entirely different, more issue-based political
arrangement. Ideological congruence alone will obviously not suffice as a strong enough
argument for such reform. At the same time, it may highlight an important, potentially
systemic shortcoming that is surprising at first, but on deeper examination reveals an
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important lesson about the consequences of political ideology – which, as shown, may
not always be positive. Whatever course of action follows, however, it will invariably
need to rest on solid evidence provided by the corresponding fields of social (in this case
probably political) science. It is my hope that in this dissertation I managed to contribute
a tiny piece to this evidence.
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Appendix – The survey as administered to participants of the MTurk
sample
Politics in Focus - MTurk
Welcome to the Politics in Focus study! By participating you help us enhance our
understanding of the public’s opinion on political issues, their importance, and their
connection to participation. The final goal is to contribute to a better understanding of the
functioning of democracy. Thank you for helping us achieve that goal! Before we begin
the survey, please read the consent form on the following page and let us know if you agree
to participate in the study by clicking either "Yes" or "No" at the bottom of the page. If you
agree to participate, all the information collected from you will be completely anonymous
and confidential. You may also choose to discontinue the study at any time.
Consent
Do you consent to participate in a research by allowing us to use your data as indicated
above?
 Yes
 No
In your own personal opinion, what are the three most important issues or problems in the
United States right now?
Click to write Choice 1
Click to write Choice 2
Click to write Choice 3
Below you will find a list of political issues in contemporary America. Please indicate
HOW IMPORTANT each one of these issues is TO YOU PERSONALLY. In other words,
if it were up to you, how much would we as a society focus on dealing with them?-2
Extremely unimportant; -1 Unimportant; 0 Somewhat important; 1 Important, 2 Extremely
important
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-2

-1

0

1

2

1. Marijuana legalization
2. Racial equality
















3. Climate change











4. Date rape











5. Media bias











6. The costs of college











7. Increasing welfare spending (social
welfare)
8.${q://QID42/ChoiceTextEntryValue/3}





















9. Wealth/income inequality











10. Internet addiction











11. Gun control











12. Crime rate/prison population
13.${q://QID42/ChoiceTextEntryValue/1}33
















14. Abortion











15. Homelessness











16. Fighting terrorism











17.${q://QID42/ChoiceTextEntryValue/2}











18. Illegal immigration











19. Same-sex marriage











20. Government-arranged healthcare











21. Gender equality











22. Increased military spending











23. Obesity











24. National debt
25. Organic farming research
















26. Please click one for this control question











27. Highway safety and design











28. Fraud and abuse in the insurance industry











29. Federal government's role in economic
development
30. Tax code reform and simplification





















33

Piped text to indicate the firs answer to the open-ended question above.
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Below you find a similar list but this time regarding the current POLITICAL ELITE of the
United States. How important do you think these issues are for them? How much do you
think they CURRENTLY FOCUS on these issues (NOT how much they ought to)?-2
Extremely unimportant (they don't focus on it at all); -1 Unimportant (they don't focus on
it); 0 Somewhat important; 1 Important (they focus on it), 2 Extremely important (much
focus on it)

156

-2

-1

0

1

2

1. Marijuana legalization
2. Racial equality
















3. Climate change











4. Date rape











5. Media bias











6. The costs of college











7. Increasing welfare spending (social
welfare)
8.${q://QID42/ChoiceTextEntryValue/3}





















9. Wealth/income inequality











10. Internet addiction











11. Gun control











12. Crime rate/prison population
13.${q://QID42/ChoiceTextEntryValue/1}
















14. Abortion











15. Homelessness











16. Fighting terrorism











17.${q://QID42/ChoiceTextEntryValue/2}











18. Illegal immigration











19. Same-sex marriage











20. Government-arranged healthcare











21. Gender equality











22. Increased military spending











23. Obesity











24. National debt
25. Organic farming research
















26. Highway safety and design











27. Fraud and abuse in the insurance
industry











28. Federal government's role in economic
development











29. Tax code reform and simplification
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Now we would like to ask you a few questions about your political views.
How interested are you in politics and public affairs?
 Not at all interested
 Not very interested
 Somewhat interested
 Very interested
Labels are often misleading but in general, do you see yourself as liberal, conservative or
something in between?
 1- Very Liberal
 2 - Liberal
 3 - Leaning Liberal
 4 - In the middle
 5 - Leaning Conservative
 6 - Conservative
 7 - Very Conservative
How well do you think this conservative-liberal dimension represents your own political
views?
 Very well, I have no difficulty placing myself along the scale and it accurately
represents my views (1)
 Reasonably well (2)
 Not too well (3)
 Not at all, the way I think about politics is entirely different (4)
Why? Please briefly explain your answer.
How well do you think this conservative-liberal dimension represents the political views
of the ruling elite in the United States?
 Very well, I have no difficulty placing politicians along the scale and it represents
their views (1)
 Reasonably well (2)
 Not too well (3)
 Not at all, the way politics works is entirely different (4)
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Please indicate HOW YOU FEEL about each topic.
- 3 Very strongly against it; -2
Strongly against it; -1 Against it; 0 Neutral (don't care); 1 Support it; 2 Strongly support it;
3 Very strongly support it
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-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3





























3. Individual
privacy must
be protected
against
governmental
intrusion.















4.
Public
policies should
discourage
homosexuality.

























































1. Our leaders
and political
institutions
should tax the
rich in order to
take care of the
needier
citizens.
2.
People
should focus
on their work
and families
and
leave
politics to the
experts.

5.
The
government
should see to it
that
every
citizen
has
healthcare
coverage.
6. We should
actively
combat climate
change.
7.
Gender
equality should
be among our
highest
priorities.
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8. Our leaders
and political
institutions
should
not
interfere with
the fact that
some people
will
just
naturally
be
more
successful than
others.















9.
Religious
views should
be kept private
and out of the
political arena.

























































10. Our leaders
should stop the
rising costs of
college.
11. Decisions
should reflect
the fact that
times change
and the oldfashioned way
of doing things
is not always
best.
12. In order to
protect
national
security,
the
government
should
be
allowed
to
collect secret
information on
its citizens.
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13.
Political
leaders
and
institutions
should
recognize that
the best way to
stop crime is to
improve social
conditions.















14.
Because
diversity
makes
us
stronger, it is
best if people
from
other
countries come
to live in ours.











































17.
Rehabilitation
of
criminals
should
be
stressed over
punishment.















18.
Laws
should restrict
immigration by
people who are
not willing to
adopt
our
values
and
language.















15. Same-sex
marriage
should
be
legal.
16. Our leaders
should do their
best to reduce
the
current
level
of
wealth/income
inequality.
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19. Our leaders
and political
institutions
should
be
allowed
to
monitor what
the people are
doing.















20. Accused
criminals
should
be
given
numerous
rights
and
protections
even
if
it
means some
crimes
go
unpunished.















21. We should
take care of our
own country’s
problems first
before we try
to help other
countries.
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-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3





























24. The death
penalty should
be available as
a punishment.















25. Decisions
should
be
made
efficiently
rather
than
after taking the
time to consult
lots of diverse
people.











































22. If you
disrespect our
national
symbols, you
are not a real
American.
23. Domestic
laws should
override
international
laws.

26.
Disagreements
are
best
resolved
through one
side getting its
way.
27. Spending
on
national
defense (the
military)
should NOT
be
high
priority
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28.
International
organizations
(such as the
United
Nations)
should never
be allowed to
have a say in
the laws of our
country.















29.
Those
serving
jail
time should be
denied
any
comfort.















30.
Our
leaders
and
political
institutions
should see to it
that
every
person has a
job and a good
standard
of
living.















31.
Immigration
from
other
countries
should be kept
to a minimum.















32. Political
leaders should
consult
religious
leaders
for
guidance.















33. Most (or
all) forms of
gun control are
unacceptable.
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34. We should
just accept the
fact that our
leaders
and
political
institutions
will soon be
involved
in
virtually every
facet of our
lives.















35.
Leaders
must
recognize
answers
are
never clearcut, either-or.











































38.
Women
should be able
to have an
abortion
whenever they
want to.















39.
Racial
equality
should be our
ideal.















36.
Public
policies
should
discourage sex
outside
of
marriage.
37.
Our
leaders
and
political
institutions
should
recognize that
people
are
ultimately
responsible for
their
own
welfare.
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40.
Leaders
should
deal
with problems
swiftly
and
with
little
debate.















41.
The
government
should do its
best
to
eradicate
homelessness.















42. It is best if
power is in the







hands of a few.
For each of the following, note how often you did it in the past two years. Have you in the
past two years:
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Once



More
than 10
times

2-3 times

4-7 times















































signed
a
political/social
petition













donated
a
significant
amount
of
your
time
and/or money
to an NGO or
civil
organization













attended
political
meeting
rally

Never

7-10
times

a
or

worked in a
political
campaign in
any capacity
(even for no
pay)
contributed
money or time
to a political
cause, party,
or candidate
communicated
your thoughts
or requests to
a
governmental
official,
an
organization,
the
mass
media and/or a
legal
institution
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this question is
testing if you
are
paying
attention,
please mark
"once"













donated
a
significant
amount
of
your
time
and/or money
to a grassroots
organization
(not aligned
with
an
existing party)





































taken part in a
boycott (e.g.
of
certain
products)













worn
displayed
campaign
badge
sticker

























attended
a
demonstration
or protest
held
any
governmental
office
no
matter
how
minor (local,
etc.)

or
a
or

worked in the
federal, state,
or
local
bureaucracy
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Below is another short list of participatory activities this time restricted to the online
environment. Please mark how often in a regular week you
Never

Once a
week

2-3 times a
week

4-6 days a
week

Every day

Multiple
times each
day

like
political
posts
on
Facebook
or
other
social
media













participate
in
a
political
discussion
or debate
online





































sign
an
online
petition













create
a
political
post













use tools to
follow
elected
officials
and
candidates
for office













use a social
networking
site
to
encourage
people to
vote













watch
a
political
video
share
political
posts
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Think of all the Presidential elections you were old enough to vote in. How often have you
voted in these?
 All elections
 Almost all elections
 A few elections
 Only one election
 None
 Wasn't old enough to vote yet.
Think of all the Congressional and Senate races you were old enough to vote in. How often
have you voted in these?
 All elections
 Almost all elections
 A few elections
 Only one election
 None
 Wasn't old enough to vote yet.
Think of all the local races you were old enough to vote in. How often have you voted in
these?
 All elections
 Almost all elections
 A few elections
 Only one election
 None
 Wasn't old enough to vote yet.
Do you think you will vote in the 2016 presidential election?
 Definitely
 Probably
 Maybe
 Certainly not
How do you feel about politics in general? In other words, when YOU think of politics,
how does that make you feel?
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-3 (very negative)
-2 (negative)
-1 (slightly negative)
0 (neutral, they don’t care)
1 (slightly positive)
2 (positive)
3 (very positive)

How do you think the majority of your FRIENDS feel about politics in general? In other
words, when they think of politics, how does that make them feel?
 -3 (very negative)
 -2 (negative)
 -1 (slightly negative)
 0 (neutral, they don’t care)
 1 (slightly positive)
 2 (positive)
 3 (very positive)
How do you think the majority of your FAMILY MEMBERS feel about politics in
general? In other words, when they think of politics, how does that make them feel?
 -3 (very negative)
 -2 (negative)
 -1 (slightly negative)
 0 (neutral, they don’t care)
 1 (slightly positive)
 2 (positive)
 3 (very positive)
During the time you were growing up, how often did you and your family members discuss
politics and public affairs?
 Never
 Less than once a month
 1-4 times a month
 2-4 times a week
 Daily
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How often do you have discussions about politics with ...?
Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

All the time





















other
acquaintances
(colleagues,
etc.)?











strangers?











your friends?
your family
members?

When it comes to politics, do you and your .... think alike regarding your policy and party
preferences?
All of them
think like me

Most of them
think like me

Some of them
think like me

Few of them
think like me

None of them
think like me

your friends?











your family
members?











other
acquaintances
(colleagues,
etc.)?











Do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent or something else?
 Democrat (1)
 Independent leaning Democrat (2)
 Independent (3)
 Independent leaning Republican (4)
 Republican (5)
 Other ____________________
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How often do you use the following sources to acquire information about politics or current
events?
Multiple
hours
each day

About an
hour per
day

2-6 days
per
week

Weekly

A few
times a
month

A few
times a
year

Never

Printed
newspaper















TV news















Radio news
TV shows






















General
websites















Social media















Specialized
blogs/political
websites
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How much do you agree with the following statements?
Fully agree

It
is
every
citizen’s civic
duty to vote.
Politics
is
boring.

Agree

Disagree

Fully disagree

















I'd be more
politically
engaged but I
feel like what I
do doesn't make
a difference.









I feel strongly
about politics.









It is exciting to
follow and take
part in politics.









It
is
every
citizen’s civic
duty to actively
try to influence
societal
decisions.









The
political
participation of
the
average
individual does
not make a
difference.









I find it highly
entertaining to
follow and take
part in politics.









Politics is very
important to me.
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Please indicate how much you trust the following institutions
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

Quite a bit

Very much

House
Senate
















Presidency











Supreme
Court











IRS











State
Department











The Military











Political
Media











Political
Parties











The Police











Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not?
 The President
 Congress
 The Supreme Court
 Another institution
Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts?
 The President
 Congress
 The Supreme Court
 Another institution
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential
veto?
 A bare majority of 50% plus one
 Two-thirds majority (67% more more)
 Three-fourths majority (75% or more)
 Not sure
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What is the main duty of the U.S. Congress?
 To write laws
 To administer the President's policies
 To supervise States' governments
 Not sure
In this block please answer some questions about yourself.
Is English your first language?
yes
no
Is the level of your English reasonably close or equivalent to that of a native speaker?
yes
no
How many close friends do you have? (Drop-down 1-6)
How many people in your life would you call friends or relatively close acquaintances?
(Drop-down 1- more than 10)
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
Strongly agree

I enjoy taking a
leadership role
in my peer
groups.
I don't like to be
in charge but I
am a good group
member.

Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

















I'd rather follow
than lead.









I only like to be
in charge when
I'm absolutely
sure I have the
necessary
knowledge to
lead.









I am the first one
to organize.









I
am
comfortable
with
a
leadership role.









How satisfied are you with your life in general? (1 Completely dissatisfied – 10 –
Completely satisfied)
In general, how happy do you consider yourself?
 Very happy
 Happy
 Not very happy
 Not at all happy
Are you male or female?
 Male
 Female
How old are you (in years)? (18-90).
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What race or races do you consider yourself?
 American Indian/Native American
 Asian/Pacific Islander
 African American/Black
 Hispanic/Latino/Latina/Chicano/Chicana
 White/Caucasian
 Other
Do you have any friends or relatives who you know to be gay, lesbian, bisexual, or
transgender?
 Yes
 No
How often do you attend religious services?
 Never
 Less than once a week
 Once a week
 2-3 times a week
 More than 3 times a week
How much do you rely on your religion for guidance in your everyday life?
 Very frequently
 Quite a lot
 Not too much
 Not at all
Please indicate in which category your family annual income currently falls.
 Below $20,000 (1)
 $20,000 to $40,000 (2)
 $40,001 to $60,000 (3)
 $60,001 to $80,000 (4)
 $80,001 to $100,000 (5)
 Over $100,000 (6)
Economically what do you consider yourself?
 Upper class
 Upper middle class
 Middle class
 Lower middle class
 Lower class
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What is the highest level of education you have obtained?
 Some high school
 Graduated high school
 Some college
 Bachelor's degree
 Some graduate school
 Master's degree
 Professional or Doctorate degree
How would you rate job or CURRENT occupation's social recognition (respect, status)?
 Very good
 Good
 Fair
 Poor
 Very Poor
How would you rate your job or CURRENT occupation's pay?
 Very good
 Good
 Fair
 Poor
 Very Poor
How would you describe your personal finances?
 Wealthy
 Comfortable
 Acceptable
 Just getting by
 Poor
It would greatly aid our process of scale development if you could indicate any questions
or comments you have regarding the whole survey or any specific part of it. Please do so
below:
Thank you for taking part in this study. Your validation code for MTurk is ______ To
receive payment for participating, click “Accept HIT” in the Mechanical Turk window,
enter this validation code, then click “Submit”. Please press on the continue button >>>
one more time

